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DECOLLECTIVIZATION AND DEMOCRACY: CURRENT LAW
PRACTICE IN ROMANIA
KANDIS ScoTr*
The legal profession was organized on the principle of bour-
geois individualism. The lawyer's activity is to beat the competi-
tion, chase after big fees and after clients, while despoiling
justice. The rich lawyers exploit colleagues without clients.1
Although some analysts would say this quote portrays the prac-
tice of law in both the United States and Romania today, it was
written to describe the Romanian legal profession before the rise
of the communist regime. The text may be an amusing, appalling,
or exaggerated depiction of the avaricious lawyer, but after forty-
five years of working in collectives, today's Romanian lawyers have
moved towards 1944 practices with surprising ease. Equally impres-
sive is that privatized law practice now so resembles U.S. solo and
small-firm practice as to belie the influence of the communist past
on the behavior of contemporary Romanian lawyers.
The correspondence between the two nations disappears upon
comparison of their lawyers' participation in civil society. Despite
similar economic justifications for community engagement,
Romanian lawyers are largely non-participants while U.S. lawyers
are active participants. Here the nations' political histories and
cultures account for the difference. Although limited, this inertial
vestige of the communist past is unfortunate: if Romanian lawyers
were active in civil society, they would be important agents in the
process of consolidating the new democracy. Those few Romanian
lawyers who volunteer in civic organizations are advance scouts of a
profession making the transition from communist control.
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. B.A. (1963), Cornell Uni-
versity; LL.B. (1966), Stanford Law School. Professor Scott is a member of the New York
Bar and California Bar. Research for this Article was supported in part by a grant from the
International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) with funds provided by the National
Endowment for the Humanities; the U.S. Department of State, which administers the Title
VIII Program; and the IREX Scholar Support Fund. None of these organizations is respon-
sible for the views expressed in this Article. Research was also supported in part by the U.S.
Department of Education under Section 102(b) (5) of the Mutual Educational and Cul-
tural Exchange Act of 1961 (Fulbright-Hays Act). I thank the Romanian lawyers who made
it possible to start this project and James Erickson, my research assistant, who made it
possible to finish it.
1. See ALEXANDRU NEGOITA, ORGANIZAREA INSTANTELOR JUDECATORESTI 126 (1965).
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Avocats are the sole focus of this Article. Avocats may represent
clients in transactions and litigation in all courts without restriction
as U.S. attorneys do. 2 In 2003 there were 12,880 avocats practicing
in Romania, of which 10,488 were full lawyers and 2392 were
apprentices who practiced only in lower courts.3 As in many other
nations, Romanian law school graduates may choose among several
career paths: notary public (notar)4; in-house or government lawyer
(jurisconsult)5; lawyer or advocate (avocat)6; and prosecutor
(procuror).v Notaries are a small, exclusive segment earning large
fees to authenticate signatures and draft certain documents. In-
house counsels represent state enterprises and other organizations
such as unions, and private businesses in all matters, including
transactional work, litigation, and a limited kind of lobbying. By
law, each in-house counsel may represent only his or her
employer.8 A final kind of Romanian lawyer is the prosecutor.
Romanian prosecutors have broad authority extending beyond
criminal cases to encompass some tasks typically performed by a
state attorney general in the United States. 9 All these jurists and
judges study the same material in the same undergraduate law
schools. 10 Only upon graduation do they make a choice of career
and satisfy separate eligibility requirements, including entry exami-
nations and further formal training in the case of judges.1 Priva-
2. Here, avocat will be used interchangeably with attorney, practitioner, and lawyer
in discussions about Romania; avocat will never be used, however, when referring to lawyers
in the United States.
3. E-mail from Veronica Morecut, Protocol Department Chief, Union of Romanian
Avocats, to author (Sept. 2, 2003) (on file with author). For the county-by-county tally of
Romanian avocats, see infra Appendix.
4. Lege No. 36, Monitorul Oficial No. 92, May 16, 1995 [hereinafter Law 36/1995].
5. Lege No. 514, Monitorul Oficial No. 867, Dec. 5, 2003 [hereinafter Law 514/
2003], abrogating Decretul 143, Buletinul Oficial No. 8, Apr. 30, 1955 (in-house lawyers).
Jurisconsults are also called consilierjuridic. See e-mail from Cristiana I. Stoica, Senior Partner
Stoica & Asociatii, to author (April 1, 2004) (on file with author).
6. Lege No. 51, Monitorul Oficial No. 116, June 9, 1995 [hereinafter Law 51/1995].
7. Lege No. 92, Monitorul Oficial No. 197, Aug. 13, 1992 [hereinafter Law 92/1992]
(prosecutors); see NEGOrrA, supra note 1, at 131 (these alternatives also existed under the
communists).
8. Law 514/2003, supra note 5, art. 6.
9. Law 92/1992, supra note 7.
10. Romanian high school graduates complete their legal education in four years, as
is true in most nations. See, e.g., MAY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADTONS
130 (2d ed. 1994).
11. New judges may study for two years at the National Institute of Magistrates or
complete a two-year apprenticeship followed by an examination. Law 92/1992, supra note
7, arts. 46(0, 52.
HeinOnline  -- 36 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 818 2004
Decollectivization and Democracy
tization of avocats eased the process of changing careers,12 and
some judges and prosecutors have since become avocats.
This Article briefly describes collectivized law practice in
Romania and then summarizes the statutes that privatized the avo-
cats' bar in 1995. Based on information garnered in interviews of
avocats in four Romanian cities in 1999-200013 and a variety of
studies concerning U.S. lawyers, the Article describes the reality of
Romanian law practice after privatization and compares it to prac-
tice under communism and to solo and small-firm U.S. practice. 14
This discussion concludes by exploring Romanian practitioners'
outlook on their profession. The Article specifically examines
Romanian lawyers' civic participation and its importance in the
future of democracy in Romania. The Appendix describes the
research and the demographics of the interview subjects.
Romania, the largest country in the Balkans, boasts the natural
beauty of the Black Sea coast, the rolling hills of Transylvania, and
the Carpathian Mountains with their rushing rivers. In contrast, it
has not enjoyed such a felicitous modern political history.15 After
World War II, Romania fell into the Soviet Union's sphere of influ-
ence, an event long resented by a nation proud of its Romance
language and its westward focus. Early in Romania's communist
years, Communist Party Secretary Gheorghe Gheorghe-Dej insti-
tuted strong Stalinist policies and jailed most dissidents, thereby
suppressing resistance to the state for decades. When Nicolae
Ceau~escu took office, he extended the industrialization of this
essentially agricultural nation. Once a darling of the West for con-
demning the Soviet incursion into Czechoslovakia, he soon lost the
image of the reasonable, independent socialist and revealed him-
self as an authoritarian leader whose informers permeated society.
Ceau~escu imposed enormous hardship on the citizens when he
sought to repay the national debt by denying them consumer
goods. Unlike other East Europeans, Romanians violently rejected
12. Law 51/1995, supra note 6, arts. 14, 17; Lege No. 51, Monitorul Oficial No. 113,
Mar. 6, 2001, arts. 16(2)(b), 19(1) [hereinafter Law 51/1995 amended].
13. Because this research was federally funded and involved human subjects who were
promised confidentiality, by law the subjects may not be identified. See 34 C.F.R.
§§ 97.101(a), 102(f), 122 (2002). Much of the information in this Article is taken from
these interviews and, because attribution or identification of the speaker would breach the
obligation of confidentiality, it is footnoted only by reference to anonymous avocats. Inter-
view notes, surveys, and compilations of them on file with author [hereinafter Interviews
with Romanian avocals]. For further description of the interviews, see Appendix.
14. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
15. See, e.g., JOSEPH HELD, DICTIONARY OF EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY SINCE 1945, at
23, 379 (1994); 23 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 673-75 (1998).
2004]
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their communist past with street protests culminating in the brief
trial and execution of Ceau~escu on December 25, 1989. Lacking
an organized opposition or dissident movement, the nation strug-
gled to restore individual rights, a democratic system, and a market
economy. One small part of this process was decollectivizing the
avocats.
I. LAw PRACTICE IN THE COLLECTIVE
To appreciate what privatization means in the professional lives
of Romanian lawyers, one should begin with a general understand-
ing of practice in a lawyers' collective under a regime that con-
trolled lawyers closely. Unlike Yugoslavia, where lawyers worked in
individual private offices despite a collective system, or Hungary,
where the state permitted private practice although it was rarely
successful,1 6 "ultra-communism at home"1 7 marked Romania. That
nation organized its bar based on the Soviet model, a tightly regu-
lated scheme 18 loosened only by unauthorized actions.
In the Romanian People's Republic, all avocats practiced in col-
lectives after 1954.19 One might visualize the collectives as local
bar associations operating law offices in the courthouses. Physi-
cally, the lawyers had to work in the collective's lawyer rooms, 20
where people came seeking legal assistance. 21 These rooms con-
tained several desks, unenclosed in any way. In many counties the
lawyers shared them, making parts of desks their offices, offering
no privacy. 22 The lawyer rooms, however, were less crowded than
they are now because there were only three law schools for avocals
16. William D. Meyer, Facing the Post-Communist Reality: Lawyers in Private Practice in
Central and Eastern Europe and the Republics of the Former Soviet Union, 26 LAw & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1019, 1029 nn.63 & 64 (1995).
17. H.B. JACOBINI, ROMANIAN PUBLIC LAw 33 (1987); see also CRISTIANA I. STOICA &
JANICE H. WEBSTER, AVOCATUL ROMAN IN SISTEMUL DE DRETr EUROPEAN 28 (1997).
18. Liviu Corvin, The Independence of Lawyers in Rumania: Some Reflections, 29 INT'L
COMM'N JURISTS REv. 50, 51 (1982).
19. Decret No. 281, Buletinul Oficial No. 34, July 21, 1954 [hereinafter Decree 281/
1954]; STOICA & WEBSTER, supra note 17, at 28. For a survey of comparable structures in
other socialist states, see Meyer, supra note 16, at 1038-41.
20. Decree 281/1954, supra note 19, art. 33(a). In Bucharest the courthouse lacked
space for avocats' rooms.
21. Telephones were uncommon, as was the practice of making appointments for any
service, so potential clients appeared at the lawyers' room and waited for an avocat.
22. Decree 281/1954, supra note 19, art. 33(c). Although the attorney-client privilege
existed during the communist era, it did not apply when the client's secret was "detrimen-
tal" to the security and peace of the Socialist Republic of Romania, which usually meant to
the interests of the Communist Party. See STOICA & WEBSTER, supra note 17, at 22, 28. Some
avocats insisted that lawyers did protect their clients' secrets, but others assert that there
were no secrets.
[Vol. 36
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in the Romanian People's Republic.2 3 Interviewees report that
until the recent explosion of new law schools, only approximately
300 students graduated each year to satisfy the nation's need for
judges, prosecutors, notaries, legal counselors, and avocats.24
Avocats received no salary. A client paid a fee to and executed a
retainer agreement with an official of the collective, called the
Bureau of Legal Assistance, not with an individual lawyer. 25 The
Minister of Justice set the fees based on the kind of legal problem,
not on the hours required, the result obtained, or the difficulty of
the problem or the client.26 The avocat received approximately
fifty percent of the fee, 27 twenty-five percent went to the lawyers'
pension fund, and the remainder covered the collective's taxes and
expenses. 28 The Minister of Justice set a maximum monthly
income, the plafond, and upon reaching the maximum, a lawyer
could accept no more cases that month.2 9 Approximately double
the average salary in Romania, according to interviewees' esti-
mates, lawyers' high incomes assured a special status for these
professionals.
Avocats responded to being governed by the Minister of Justice
in various ways, as reflected by their attitudes to privatization.
Some avocals believe they were treated as state functionaries and
consider it significant that the privatization law now characterizes
advocacy as a "free and liberal profession."30 Many others insist
that avocats were never government bureaucrats, so privatization
was not a critical status change. They support this perspective with
certain facts. For example, a lawyer was not salaried and his or her
income varied with the number of clients and kinds of cases 31; the
23. The law schools were located in the Universities in Bucharest, Cluj, and Ia~i. LAw
AND JUDICIAL SYSTEMS OF NATIONS 622 (Charles S. Rhyne ed., 1978).
24. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13; e-mail from Cristiana I. Stoica,
Senior Partner Stoica & Asociatii, to author (Apr. 1, 2004) (on file with author); e-mail
from Cristian Pup, Justice of Romanian Court of Appeals, to author (Apr. 1, 2004) (on file
with author).
25. Decree 281/1954, supra note 19, art. 34.
26. Id. art. 23(b); see also Corvin, supra note 18, at 52.
27. The lawyer's percentage varied over time and once was as high as 70%, before
pension contribution and taxes. Decree 281/1954, supra note 19, art. 36. More exper-
ienced lawyers received a larger percentage of the fee paid, and the Minister of Justice
occasionally changed the proportions.
28. See Corvin, supra note 18, at 52.
29. Decree 281/1954, supra note 19; Corvin, supra note 18, at 52; see also STOICA &
WEBSTER, supra note 17, at 28-29.
30. Law 51/1995, supra note 6, art. 1.
31. Decree 281/1954, supra note 19, art. 36. Not all lawyers reached the plafond each
month.
2004]
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avocats' pension plan was separate from the general national pen-
sion plan32; and the lawyer had duties to clients as well as to the
state.33 Like other government employees, however, avocats were
subject to evaluations by inspectors sent by the Ministry of Justice,
which had the authority to discipline incompetent lawyers. 34
The reality of collectivized law practice differed importantly
from the legislative design. As in the German Democratic Repub-
lic when ninety-six percent of the lawyers were collectivized, "the
profession never lost its faintly capitalist perfume of manipulative
and clever contentiousness [and] ... excessive preoccupation with
private interests." 35 Although some avocats remember a greater
spirit of collegiality in the collectives than currently exists among
lawyers, the socialist structure did not prevent all economic compe-
tition for lawyers found ways to avoid the monthly earnings
limitation.
Unlike the practice in most U.S. legal services offices, Romanian
clients could choose their lawyers. Avocats thus had a financial
incentive to preserve their relationships with former or potential
clients who could become repeat clients or refer new business. To
build a clientele, avocats managed the flow of work to keep a cli-
ent's case without exceeding the monthly maximum income.3 6
Successfully competing for a large clientele could increase real
income substantially. Lawyers sought or accepted "presents" from
clients that they did not report to the collective, a practice the
penal law prohibited as a form of corruption.3 7 Although the gen-
erality of this practice is disputed, the consensus among lawyers is
that gifts, such as food (especially valuable during the austerity
Ceau~escu created), perfume, and liquor, were universal, as were
32. Decret No. 60, Buletinul Oficial No. 88 (1951) [hereinafter Decree 60/1951];
Decree 281/1954, supra note 19, art. 52.
33. Decree 281/1954, supra note 19, arts. 4, 33-35.
34. Decret No. 281, Buletinul Oficial No. 34 (1954), amended by Decret No. 11, Bule-
tinul Oficial No. 11, art. 15 (1958) [hereinafter Decree 11/1958].
35. See Inga Markovits, Children of a Lesser God: GDR Lawyers in Post-Socialist Germany, 94
MICH. L.REv. 2270, 2300 (1996).
36. Avocats asked clients to manage the immediate court appearance alone, and the
lawyer appeared the following month, or asked another attorney to handle a client's mat-
ter with the understanding that the client belonged to the first lawyer. Wanting to reach
the maximum earnings each month, Romanian lawyers remained available to new clients,
unlike Bulgarian lawyers who simply went skiing or to the beach after reaching their maxi-
mum monthly earnings. See William D. Myer, Bulgarian Lawyers in Transition, 18J. LEGAL
PROF. 123, 131 (1993).
37. See Corvin, supra note 18, at 52-53; see also Decree 281/1954, supra note 19, art.
33(b).
[Vol. 36
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cash payments. 38  Practice diverged from the law in one other
important way. Although the law prohibited lawyers from consult-
ing clients anywhere other than in the courthouse collective,3 9 they
regularly conferred in avocats' homes. Lawyers justified this by the
crowded condition of the lawyers' rooms and the need for pri-
vacy.40 Nevertheless, this practice also permitted secret receipt of
gifts and fees in excess of those set by law and paid to the collective.
Consultation in the avocat's home was well-known and accepted
despite its illegality. 41
Although these unenforced rules suggest the legal authorities
were no threat, the opposite was often true in Ceau~escu's oppres-
sive regime. After establishing a lawyer-client relationship, an avo-
cat represented a client as would any other lawyer in the restricted
world of a socialist legal system. Because most people did not own
significant property-only their personal effects, perhaps an apart-
ment or house, and in some regions a farm or garden plot42-
many legal problems that occur in non-socialist countries did not
arise in Romania. Private business was nonexistent as were issues
like bankruptcy, large loans, and securities fraud. Administrative
law, consumer claims, and many simple transactions basic to West-
ern law practice were rare at best. The prosecutor's office litigated
most torts as a part of related criminal prosecutions. Informal
tribunals in the workplace, where avocats could not appear,
resolved minor disputes, such as petty crimes, family disputes, and
grievances between employees. 43 Moreover, many people repre-
sented themselves in court, and law was relatively unimportant
under socialism. 44 The core of most lawyers' work was criminal
defense (including a broad group of political crimes), divorce
(involving both custody and division of small amounts of prop-
38. Interestingly, while many lawyers stress the danger of accepting gifts, they
acknowledge the prevalence of the practice.
39. Decree 281/1954, supra note 19, art. 33.
40. See supra note 22.
41. Several lawyers mentioned the threat of undercover police posing as clients to test
whether an attorney would consult at home or take additional fees. Allowing clients into
one's home also risked reports to authorities about one's possessions and the suggestion of
unexplained wealth. I heard no reports of a specific case of this, and the Bar's belief that
the practice occurred, if sincerely held, did not seem to have a strong deterrent effect.
Corvin does not claim that arrests were common. See Corvin, supra note 18, at 53.
42. SeeJOHN N. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW 156 (1969).
43. Some lawyers served as observers or advisors at these meetings and report that the
non-lawyer "judges" used publicity and shame or perhaps wage deduction to sanction anti-
social behavior.
44. See Kathryn Hendley et al., Agents of Change or Unchanging Agents? The Role of Law-
yers Within Russian Industrial Enterprises, 26 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 685, 686 (2001).
2004]
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erty), some probate, and occasional employment disputes. Lawyers
report that because the legal questions fell within a very narrow
field, they could become well versed in all the relevant law.45
In sum, communist Romania's lawyers were privileged profes-
sionals able to earn decent wages, supplemented by gifts, while
practicing rather mundane law in an unstressed atmosphere. They
wanted more, however, and pined for the pre-communist profes-
sional life.
II. PRIVATIZATION
Privatization of Romanian avocals began quickly, nine days after
the fall of the communist state, 46 but the process required five
years for completion. 47  Decree-Law 90/199048 made avocats sub-
ject to only "the laws and their consciences" when exercising their
profession, thereby abolishing the Minister of Justice's control of
lawyers. 49 Nevertheless, the new lawyer-controlled administrative
system paralleled the old one.50 Explicitly acknowledging the simi-
larity, the privatization statute specified that bar association offi-
cials, who would exercise what had been the state's authority, were
not government employees. 51 There was no change to the daily
operation and location of the courthouse Bureaus of Legal Assis-
tance or in client representation. 52
45. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
46. A temporary government formed and quickly repealed many Communist-era laws.
For example, less than seven weeks after the fall of Ceau~escu, Romania's provisional lead-
ership "legalized free enterprise on a much larger scale than existed in 45 years of Commu-
nist rule" by allowing "profit-making businesses with up to 20 employees" and permitting
"families and individuals to start their own businesses." Associated Press, New Bucharest
Leaders Give Go-Ahead to Free Enterprise, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1990, at A18.
47. See Flavius Antonius Baias, Principiile Profesiei de Avocat in Lumina Dispoziliilor Legii,
No. 51/1995, VI DREPTUL 29 (1995); see alsoJane Ryder, The Legal Profession in Romania and
Bulgaria, 1994J.L. Soc'Y SCOT. 59, 60.
48. Decret-Lege No. 90, Monitorul Oficial No. 32, Jan. 3, 1990 [hereinafter Decree-
Law 90/1990].
49. Id. art. 2.
50. Id. arts. 3-8, 12. Article 12 specifically identifies the new organizational titles with
those under the communists. Ten of the twelve Articles in the law are dedicated to the
organizational structure of the profession rather than actual practice, the thrust of this
Article.
51. Id. art. 2.
52. See Ilie Tudor, Consideralii in Legdturd cu Recenta Reglementare a Organizdrii Si
Exercilirii Avocaturii, V DREPTruL 57, 59 (1994); see also Stoica & Webster, supra note 17, at
29; see also Ligia Danila, Reprezentarea Avocaliald 29 (1998) (unpublished doctoral thesis,
Babei-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca) (on file with author).
[Vol. 36
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Without specifically addressing avocats' freedom to set legal fees,
Decree-Law 90/1990 abrogated the limitation on earnings. 53 Even
after more extensive privatization of the bar, however, many law-
yers are unable to identify any "important" changes that followed
the initial fee deregulation. 54 The practical effect of Decree-Law
90/1990 permitted avocats to increase their client base and income
without the overhead expenses of private law offices.55 During this
period, many judges and prosecutors left their positions to become
financially successful avocats. From the Romanian public's perspec-
tive, the higher cost of privatized law practice was all that differed
from law practice during the communist period.
Avocats became fully privatized in 1995. Law 51/1995, modified
only slightly in 2001 and 2002,56 makes the profession "free and
independent, autonomously organized and functioning, under
[the privatization] law and the regulations of the profession."57
Only the statutorily created Romanian bar organizations regulate
lawyers, unsupervised by court or legislature. 58 Much of the priva-
tization statute is dedicated to the structure, duties, and authority
of those private organizations: the powerful county bar associa-
53. Decree-Law 90/1990, supra note 48.
54. This was despite the fact that many have opened offices outside of the courthouse,
which was authorized only in the 1995 law. See Tudor, supra note 52, at 59; see also STOICA &
WEBSTER, supra note 17, at 29.
55. Between 1990 and 1995, avocats could prepare financially to open private offices.
The 1995 privatization law permitted avocats to deduct investment in offices and equip-
ment from income for three years. Law 51/1995, art. 77.
56. Law 51/1995 amended, supra note 12 (amended 2000, 2002); Lege No. 231,
Monitorul Oficial No. 635, Dec. 7, 2000 [hereinafter Law 231/2000] (amending Law 51/
1995). Lege No. 489, Monitorul Oficial No. 578, Aug. 5, 2002 [hereinafter Law 489/2002],
promulgated additional revisions permitting foreign lawyers to practice in Romania under
certain conditions, but Law 51/1995 was not republished to contain those amendments,
which are of no importance to this Article. As noted supra note 12, the final, republished
version of Law 51/1995 (Law 51/1995 amended) is found in Monitorul Oficial No. 113,
Mar. 6, 2001.
57. Law 51/1995 amended, supra note 12, art. 1. An attenuated form of this concept
existed in the early part of the communist regime. See Baias, supra note 47, at 29.
58. U.S. lawyers commenting on a proposed law on the organization of the Romanian
legal profession prepared by the American Bar Association Central and East European Law
Initiative observed that the law provided no oversight of the profession by non-lawyers,
courts, government agencies, or consumer interest groups, while at the same time over-
regulating certain aspects of practice. Correspondence of Prof. Lisa Lerman (July 31,
1993) and Edmund B. Spaeth,Jr. (July 29, 1993); CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN LAW INITIA-
TIVE, AM. BAR Ass'N, ANALYSIS OF THE ROMANIAN DRAFr LAW ON THE ORGANIZATION AND
PRACTICE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (Aug. 27, 1993) (summary of comments) (on file with
author).
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tions; the national Union of Romanian Avocats; and the Avocats'
Insurance Fund, the lawyers' pension plan. 59
Additionally, Law 51/1995 provides for practical changes in the
practice of law. For example, lawyers are specifically entitled to
fees, 60 the national Union of Avocats establishes a minimum fee
schedule, 61 and county bar associations resolve fee disputes with a
right of appeal to the Union of Romanian Avocats. 62 One highly
visible difference is that avocats may leave the lawyer rooms and
open private offices if they wish. 63 The law also expands protection
of client confidences. 64 The rules continue to flatly prohibit adver-
tising and publicity.65 Bar rules require malpractice insurance in
specified amounts of hard currency. 66 Jobs for law school gradu-
ates are no longer guaranteed or assigned.67
59. See Law 51/1995 amended, supra note 12, arts. 47-56 (county bar associations),
arts. 57-67 (national Union of Romanian Avocats), arts. 75-80 (pension plan). Avocats had
a separate and desirable pension plan under the communists. Assuring its preservation
delayed the adoption of a full privatization law. Under Law 51/1995 amended, the Union
of Romanian Romanian Avocats administers the independent pension plan (art. 75), the
bar entrance exams (art. 65(2)(c)), and hears appeals of disciplinary actions (art. 72(2)).
The local bar associations determine a lawyer's admission to practice in the county (art.
53(2) (e)-(f)) and discipline attorneys (art. 72(1)), as they did before the communist take-
over. See Corvin, supra note 18, at 50.
60. Law 51/1995 amended, supra note 12, art. 30(1).
61. Id. art. 63(e); Statut 284, Monitorul Oficial No. 284, May 31, 2001 [hereinafter Bar
Regulation 284/2001], art. 94(2).
62. Law 51/1995 amended, supra note 12, art. 31; Bar Regulation 284/2001, supra
note 61, art. 95.
63. Statut profesiei de avocat, Monitorul Oficial No. 237, Oct. 17, 1995, art. 96. The
avocat's choice of location for a law practice was originally subject to the local bar associa-
tions' obligation "to assure legal services in all the legal forums." Law 51/1995, supra note
6, art. 31. Amendments to the privatization law abrogated that authority over office loca-
tion. Law 231/2000, supra note 56, art. 1 § 18. Some lawyers, anticipating a change, found
office space and opened their new quarters on the day the legislation took effect. Other
lawyers economize by practicing out of courthouse lawyer rooms or their homes.
64. Law 51/1995 amended, supra note 12, arts. 33, 44(2); Bar Regulation 284/2001,
supra note 61, art. 5. Contra Decree 281/1954, supra note 19, art. 33(c) (requiring lawyers
to report client communications when detrimental to state security and the peace).
65. Law 51/1995 amended, supra note 12, art.46(2); Bar Regulation 284/2001, art.
115. The advertising regulations are highly detailed; for example, they specify the maxi-
mum size of a sign outside a lawyer's office and of the notice a lawyer is allowed to place
(in the written press only) when opening or changing an office's location or his or her
form of practice.
66. Bar Regulation 284/2001, supra note 61, art. 106.
67. Under the communists, the Minister of Justice allocated law school graduates by
allowing them to choose among designated positions according to their final grade point
average. Decret No. 281, amended, Buletinul Oficial No.11, Mar. 6, 1958, art. 20. Those
ranked low in their class were assured of work somewhere but had little choice. Six of the
avocats interviewed began their legal careers other than where they practice now. Most
were judges at the time the state assigned them to smaller, often unattractive, cities. All
moved for personal and family reasons when they could.
HeinOnline  -- 36 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 826 2004
Decollectivization and Democracy
Another revision gives lawyers the authority and freedom to asso-
ciate in forms comparable to U.S. lawyers' arrangements. Under
the law, Romanian lawyers can now work as solo practitioners
(cabinetul individual) and such solo practitioners may share space
and expenses (cabinete grupate). The lawyers may also form partner-
ships (cabinetul asociat), or professional corporations (societatea
civila profesionala).68 Avocats may employ other lawyers. 69 A sole
practitioner (avocat colaborator) may use the infrastructure of
another avocat and earn a small payment for any work done on that
lawyer's cases while representing his or her own clients. 70 Despite
this new freedom to associate, the number of Romanian law firms
(grupate, partnerships, or professional corporations) in 2000 was
negligible, especially outside Bucharest. 71 Seven of forty-seven avo-
cats interviewed worked in professional corporations, three of
which were located in Bucharest.72 The largest of these firms,
which represented important international clients, had thirteen
professionals: three partners, six apprentice lawyers, and four law
students. 73
Lawyers began affiliating by 2003. The number of professional
corporations in Bucharest increased from twenty-six in 2000, to 149
in 2003, but the number of partnerships increased from twenty-six
to only thirty-four.74 In Timi§oara, the number of professional cor-
porations increased from two to ten. Nevertheless, in 2003, Tdrgu
Mure had one professional corporation and Ia~i had none, a fact
that reflects continued resistance to formal grouping.
Many sections of the privatization law perpetuate the commu-
nist-era rules with only slight modifications. The organizational
structure of the bar and its disciplinary procedures are not signifi-
cantly different, although they are now independent of state con-
68. Law 51/1995 amended, supra note 12, art. 5; Bar Regulation 284/2001, supra note
61, arts.16-22. An arrangement other than sole practice must be registered with the local
bar association.
69. Bar Regulation 284/2001, supra note 61, arts. 17, 18, 19, 22.
70. Collaborating attorneys are more like independent contractors than employees.
This arrangement is attractive to young and elderly avocats who cannot or do not choose to
invest in their own solo practices. Law 51/1995 amended, supra note 12, art. 5(2), (5); Bar
Regulation 284/2001, supra note 61, arts. 17, 18, 22.
71. See infta text accompanying notes 170, 240.
72. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
73. Id.
74. Id.; Morecut, supra note 3 (year 2003 data); Fax from Dragomir Toma, President
of Bucharest Bar Association, to author (May 8, 2000) (year 2000 data) (on file with
author).
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trol.75  The separate and beneficial pension plan for avocats
remains in existence. 76 Procedures for entry to the profession do
not differ significantly from the past. Although the national Union
of Romanian Avocats administers uniform national bar examina-
tions77 and formally approves admission to the bar,78 a specific
county bar must first accept an applicant.79 Romania, approxi-
mately the size of Oregon, continues to limit nationwide practice
by restricting avocats' movement or expansion. 80 Like its commu-
nist precursor, the current law obliges lawyers to represent poor
litigants.8' Bar leaders divided each communist-era collective into
small groups in which the lawyers heard communist propaganda,
learned about new laws, and discussed their cases. The privatiza-
tion law perpetuates this idea of continuing legal education, but
not the communist-era format.8 2
In several respects avocats avoid the new privatization law when it
interferes with their practice, just as they evaded the communist
regulations. For example, most Romanian lawyers are uninter-
ested in bar meetings, and attendance is spotty despite the statu-
tory obligation to participate. 83 In addition, avocats with few clients
charge less than the national minimum fee schedule.8 4 Financially
successful lawyers tolerate this transgression because they do not
need to compete for low-income clients.
75. Law 51/1995 amended, supra note 12, arts. 70-74; Bar Regulation 284/2001,
supra note 61, arts. 149-81. Compare Decree 102/1958, arts. 39-45;JAcOBINI, supra note 17,
at 30-31.
76. Law 51/1995 amended, supra note 12, art. 32.
77. Id. arts. 63(c), 65(b), 65(c); Bar Regulation 284/2001, supra note 61, art. 48.
78. • Law 51/1995 amended, supra note 12, art. 63 (g).
79. Bar Regulation 284/2001, supra note 61, arts. 28(1), 50. County-by-county admis-
sion is implicit in Law 51/1995 amended, art. 35.
80. If an applicant wishes to be admitted to the bar in a county other than where
domiciled, the applicant must give notice to the bar in the county of domicile. Bar Regula-
tion 284/2001, supra note 12, art. 50(2). To move an existing practice, an avocat must show
the new county's bar association good cause for the move and must provide a certificate of
good status from the bar association in the county being left. Id. art. 8(1), (2). Opening a
second office in a different county requires another application. Law 51/1995 amended,
supra note 12, art. 35; Bar Regulation 284/2001, supra note 61, art. 97. Each of these proce-
dures requires payment of a fee and reportedly requires a large bribe.
81. Law 51/1995 amended, supra note 12, art. 39; Bar Regulation 284/2001, supra
note 61, arts. 105, 142-48; Decree 281/1954, supra note 19, arts. 37-38.
82. Law 51/1995 amended, supra note 12, art. 630); Bar Regulation 284/2001, art.
15. Avocals must participate in the programs of the independent nonprofit educational
Institute for the Preparation and Improvement of Avocats.
83. Law 51/1995 amended, supra note 12, art. 41.
84. Id. art. 63(e); Bar Regulation 284/2001, supra note 61, art. 94(2); see infra text at
note 216.
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Avocats use control over their professional lives to protect their
financial and other personal interests. Lawyers avoid doing pro
bono work despite legal requirements. 85 Apprentice lawyers and
beginning advocates receive priority in criminal defense assign-
ments, which are reimbursed by the State, while lawyers receiving a
pension are excused from such work. The State thus diverts some
small fees to struggling novices in need of experience, meanwhile
limiting the pro bono duties of experienced lawyers. 86 Both effects
suggest a lawyer-oriented rather than client-oriented view of public
service. 87 Moreover, the law strongly favors local, established avo-
cats by making admission to the bar and relocation or expansion of
a law practice difficult and costly88 and by imposing barriers to
entry by other legal professionals, such as in-house counsel. 89
Nonetheless many judges and prosecutors, well known and
respected for their former powers, quickly changed careers and
became successful avocats.90 Despite their own advantages, many
85. Law 51/1995 amended, supra note 12, art. 39; Bar Regulation 284/2001, supra
note 61, arts. 105, 142-48.
86. Bar Regulation 284/2001, supra note 61, art. 105. Indigents apply to the county
bar president for unpaid counsel in civil cases. Law 51/1995 amended, supra note 12, arts.
39, 53(2)(1), 68-69; Bar Regulation 284/2001, supra note 61, art. 105. The Ministry of
Justice compensates criminal defense poorly. See infta text at note 222. There is no pay for
representing indigents in civil matters. Law 51/1995 amended, supra note 12, art. 69. In
reality many lawyers beg off all pro bono work.
87. Conversations with lawyers reflect the same attitude. Cf RodneyJ. Uphoff, Why In-
house Live Client Clinics Won't Work In Romania: Confessions of a Clinician Educator, 6 CLINIcA
L. REV. 315, 327-28 (1999) (discussing Romanian law school clinical programs reflecting
similar values).
88. Underemployed lawyers want to leave counties with little legal work for counties
which appear to offer more opportunities. Lawyers in counties with substantial legal busi-
ness do not wish to share that with more lawyers and so restrict entry. See supra note 80.
89. Law 51/1995, supra note 6, art. 14. Law 51/1995 permitted judges, prosecutors,
and notaries to become avocats without taking the entry bar exam if they had four years
experience. Id. art. 16. Parliament privatized notaries public earlier. They organized
quickly, and were doing well financially, so did not utilize this right. The avocats vigorously
resisted admitting in-house counsel to their ranks and successfully excluded them from the
reclassification law. As expected, in-house counsel chose not to begin again from the start,
taking all exams and serving an apprenticeship. Since 2001 in-house counsel can become
avocats without taking the initial bar exam if they have ten years' experience; See text
accompanying note 149. Although now meaningless to jurisconsults, the requirement of five
years' experience for excusing jurists from the apprentice stage and final bar exam has not
changed. Career changes are no longer significant because law students now make their
professional choices understanding the privatized forms of the legal profession.
90. See Peter Murrell, Demand and Supply in Romanian Commercial Courts: Generating
Information for Institutional Reform (2d draft) (2001), available at http://www.iris.umd.edu/
adass/proj/murrell-courts.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2004). Judges' salaries are lower than
many lawyers' salaries.
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avocals envy the great financial success of the notaries public who
privatized quickly and restricted entry to their profession. 91
V. LAw PRACTICE IN RoMANIA TODAY
A. Overview
The law practice of a typical Romanian lawyer remarkably resem-
bles his or her practice under communism. Litigation on behalf of
individual clients continues to dominate the avocat's work. These
clients are not a stable source of income because most present
"one-shot, trouble" problems.92 Rather than specialize, lawyers
accept nearly all clients in order to maximize their income. As a
result, Romanian avocats must be entrepreneurial, 93 constantly
.seeking to enlarge their clientele. Although they may have private
offices, avocats continue to crowd the lawyer rooms in the court-
houses. Only recently have they begun to exercise the statutory
authority to form firms or even share office space. Legal problems
are now a little more varied, and most avocats work harder and
enjoy their work and clients more than under the communist
regime. On balance, however, the look of law practice now is
much like it was when lawyers were collectivized.
While Romanian legal practice is much the same as it was in the
collectives, it is also similar to solo general practice in the United
States in terms of clients, cases, work life, and remuneration. 94 In
91. See infra notes 138-141 and accompanying text. The notaries public charge sub-
stantial fees to authenticate the many documents required by the formalistic Romanian
system, including property transfers. As real property is being denationalized, these fees
have provoked criticism by the citizenry, but no open protest. Notaries adhere to their
"minimum fee schedule" and protect their economic advantage. Avocats said that one can
become a notary in a sizeable city only if one's parent is a notary.
92. JOEL F. HANDLER, THE LAWYER AND HIS COMMUNITY- THE PRACTICING BAR IN A MID-
DLE-SIZED CITY 55 (1967).
93. Entrepreneurial lawyers are economically vulnerable solo and small-firm lawyers.
They must earn a living while building a practice, which requires strategy, initiative, and
building relationships with clients, not colleagues. They measure their success financially.
They have much autonomy but few prestigious clients. See DONALD D. LANDON, COUNTRY
LAWYERS: THE IMPACT OF CONTEXT ON PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 51-52 (1990) (citing Dan C.
Lortie, Institutional and Entrepreneurial Careers in Law and Medicine (1960) (unpub-
lished paper)).
94. There have been substantial empirical studies of U.S. lawyers. I have chosen solo
and small-firm practitioners as my point of comparison with Romanian lawyers because
most Romanians do practice alone and the similarities with the United States are greatest.
U.S. researchers have studied practitioners in rural areas, small or medium-sized towns,
and urban areas separately. The differences among these groups are of little significance in
an examination of post-socialist Romanian law practice, but I often preserve the original
specifications. Some firms in Bucharest engage in the kind of large-scale corporate work
done by large U.S. urban law firms, see JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO
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both countries, the majority of lawyers practice as individuals or in
small firms, 95 experiencing similar competitive pressures from both
lawyers and non-lawyers. These similarities belie any controlling
influence of communism on the profession in Romania today.
B. Clients
Romanian avocats have "person-intensive" practices like those in
small towns in the United States. 96 Even in their limited business
work, they serve individual owners of small retail establishments,
such as beauty shops or corner stores. 97 Very few avocats (almost all
of whom are in Bucharest) represent major privatized or privatiz-
ing companies comparable to the client base of large U.S. metro-
politan firms. 98 Similarly, fifty-seven percent of the U.S. solo and
small-firm lawyers surveyed in one study derived half or more of
their income from small retail and service businesses. 99
Additionally, the incomes of clients in both countries are mod-
est. Few Romanians are wealthy; most are poor-the official
reported average monthly income in 2000 was $1321°°-but not
LAWYERs: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 18-20 (1982), but they are not representative
of Romanian lawyers so a comparison with these lawyers would be less enlightening.
95. In 1995, 62% of private practitioners in the United States were in solo practice or
firms of five or fewer attorneys. In 1960, 64% of lawyers in private practice were solo.
Despite the decline in the proportion of solo practitioners, their number increased in this
time from 131,840 to 297,724. CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 1995, at
7-8 (1995).
96. Ninety per cent of a rural Missouri lawyer's clients are individuals and in a small
city 62% of the clients are individuals. LANDON, supra note 93, at 25.
97. Private businesses presenting commercial law problems arose only in. 1990 after
the fall of communism. Large state enterprises have been slow to liquidate or privatize in
Romania. They continue in their old form with in-house counsel from the communist era.
See Cristi Cretzan, Romania Worries IMF-Progress on the Economy Doesn't Mask Concerns Over
Privitization, Wages, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 29, 2002, at M10.
98. HANDLER, supra note 92, at 32. Chicago lawyers averaged 35% of their income
from corporate clients, but rural Missouri attorneys averaged only 8% of their income from
corporations. LANDON, supra note 93, at 25.
99. HANDLER, supra note 92, at 14; see also Leslie C. Levin, Preliminary Reflections on the
Professional Development of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 70 FoRDHAM L. REv. 847, 857
(2001).
100. The exact average monthly gross salary in 2000 was $132.61. This figure is derived
by dividing the average monthly salary in lei by the average exchange rate, as reported by
the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (NISES). In 2000, the average
monthly salary was 2,876,645 lei. NISES, http://www.roembus.org (last visited Mar. 15,
2004). The average exchange rate was 21,692 lei per dollar. NISES, http://
tpb.traderom.ro/En/Cd/framegen.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2004). There is a significant
but unquantifiable "under the table" economy. But even including that the nation is gener-
ally poor, one study estimates that Romania's "shadow economy" was the equivalent of
18.3% of GDP in 1994-95. Friedrich Schneider & Dominik Enste, Shadow Economies Around
the World: Size, Causes, and Consequences, 38J. EcoN. LIT. 77, 101 tbl. 5 (2000) (citing Simon
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destitute. Most are able to afford with some effort the relatively low
fees for legal representation.10 In U.S. rural communities, clients
are older and have less income and less education than those in
cities,10 2 characteristics shared with Romanian rural clients. 10 3
For sole practitioners representing individual clients in one-shot
matters, developing new relationships is paramount. Romanian
lawyers, inhibited by stringent prohibitions on advertising or other
publicity, 0 4 find clients just as U.S. lawyers did before they could
advertise. 105 In both nations, former clients are the greatest source
of new business. Former clients recommend a lawyer to others or
return with new problems. 10 6 Otherwise, new clients in Romania
are most likely to be found in the courthouses: indigent criminal
defendants assigned by judges, people referred by court personnel,
and walk-in clients. 10 7 .
A walk-in client is a person in need of legal services and who,
having no avocat's name, conducts an in-person Yellow Page
search. The continued use of the lawyers' rooms 08 is sustained by
such clients, who know from their own or others' experience dur-
ing the communist-era that one can find legal services there. It is
not easy to find a lawyer outside the court building. The law pro-
Johnson et al., Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy, 88 AM. ECON. REv. 387, 391
(1998)). Another study, using different methodology, estimated 31.6%. Id. (citing MARIA
LACKO, HIDDEN ECONOMY AN UNKNOWN QuANTITY? COMPARATIVE ANALYSES OF HIDDEN
ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES IN 1989-95 (Econ. Dep't U. Linz, Aus., Working
Paper No. 9905, 1999)).
101. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
102. Blue-collar clients average 45% of the rural practitioner's caseload and 39% of the
small city lawyer's caseload. LANDON, supra note 93, at 25 table 2.4. But see HANDLER, supra
note 92, at 14.
103. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
104. See supra note 65.
105. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (permitting lawyer advertis-
ing). Most U.S. solo and small-firm lawyers now advertise in some way, especially in the
Yellow Pages. CARROLL SERON, THE BUSINESS OF PRACTICING LAw: THE WORK LIVES OF SOLO
AND SMALL-FIRM ATroRNEYS 52-58 (1996).
106. SERON, supra note 105, 52-57.
107. Only a very small percentage of new clients are walk-ins in the United States. Id. at
53.
108. Nine of thirty-four attorneys worked in the lawyer rooms 30-60% of their business
day. Five never worked there and three worked in the courthouse rooms 90-100% of the
time. These data represent avocat behavior outside the capital. The only available space in
the Bucharest courthouse is an overcrowded waiting area, full of smoke and people sur-
rounding a few lawyers conversing with clients. In Bucharest lawyers seem to have worked
in their homes, despite the interviewees' reluctance to admit that and the statutory prohi-
bition of it.
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hibits advertising 09 ; it restricts the size of office signs"l0 ; many
offices are located in ordinary apartment buildings that are diffi-
cult to findlll; and telephone service remains limited.1 12 In Ia~i,
the bar association opened a large lawyer room with new matching
desks arranged in neat rows in a building just across a pedestrian
walkway from the courthouse. The room is nearly empty, however,
and most lawyers linger in the court halls, where potential clients
approach them. Under these conditions, it is unsurprising that the
courthouse should be a marketplace for lawyers.
Notaries public and public functionaries including the police
also refer clients in Romania, 113 and a few avocats compensate
them. Comparable referral sources in the United States are profes-
sionals such as realtors, accountants, bankers, and bondsmen, who
may receive gifts from lawyers. 114 Referrals from other lawyers are
not a meaningful source of clients in Romania but are sometimes
significant in the United States. 115 In both Romania and the
United States, lawyers initially draw clients from the pool of their
family and old friends.116 Lawyers in the United States differ from
avocats in that they expand these social circles by participating in
local organizations and political activities. 1 7
The Romanian lawyer's situation lies between that of the urban
and rural general practitioner in the United States. Urban lawyers
are anonymous and, therefore, resigned to the residue of cases left
by the major firms. Rather than trying to become known, they use
"brokers" who refer clients.118 U.S. rural practitioners, although at
109. See supra note 65. Some litigants are not confident of obtaining justice out of the
courthouse, and a few continue to think of lawyering as a government profession.
110. Id.
111. Zoning regulations do not bar such mixed uses, but one office in Iai was not
identified as anything more than an apartment because neighbors objected to its presence.
112. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
113. Attorneys tend to use the services of one or two notaries for all their work, so
notaries public have an economic incentive to refer clients to helpful attorneys.
114. U.S. lawyers give oranges, rather than money. SERON, supra note 105, at 53-54.
115. Where lawyers avoid certain kinds of cases, they will refer clients to other attor-
neys. See id. at 53; HANDLER, supra note 92, at 120.
116. LANDON, supra note 93, at 86; SERON, supra note 105, at 54-55.
117. LANDON, supra note 93, at 85. Ambitious avocats cut costs, but do not increase
income with marketing efforts. Regardless of experience, only a few Romanian lawyers
develop strategies to increase their number of clients, such as joining with more exper-
ienced attorneys willing to share their work or going weekly to a small town outside the
county seat to serve clients. See infra Part IV (discussing community participation).
118. LANDON, supra note 93, at 57. Brokers include doctors, insurance agents, building
contractors, mechanics, ministers, undertakers, and personnel directors. JEROME E. CARLIN,
LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN: THE SOLO PRACTITIONER IN AN URBAN SETTING 135, 142, 148
(1994); see also text accompanying notes 107-08.
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first drawing on the residue of other lawyers, are known in their
small communities. By cultivating their reputations, they build
their practices. 119 Like urban lawyers in the United States, Romani-
ans are unknown beyond their family and social circles when they
begin practice. Like their rural counterparts, however, they desire
great success and want to build reputations as great, wealthy law-
yers. In other words, Romanian avocats aspire to resemble rural
lawyers, but behave like urban general practitioners in the United
States.
C. Competition
Both nations' lawyers find the competition for clients from law-
yers and non-lawyers among the most challenging aspects of solo
general practice.1 20 In a middle-sized U.S. city, eighty-eight per-
cent of the bar acknowledged that there was some or even a great
deal of competition among lawyers, and twenty-two percent said
they had been hurt by such competition. 121
The problem is worse in Romania due to the sudden surge in
the number of new avocats competing for clients.1 22 The number
of Romanian law schools increased from three to twenty-six1 23
between the fall of communism in 1989 (effectively the 1990
school year) and 2000. The number of law students increased
from 3,975 in 1990-1991 to 53,445 in 1997-1998.124 Although a few
of these students take other legal positions, and some fail to pass
the bar, the majority become avocats.125 Some new lawyers have
family connections that bring them clients, and a tiny number
119. LANDON, supra note 93, at 57.
120. CARLIN, supra note 118, at xx-xxi, 115-16. Sixty per cent of Romanian interview-
ees rated competition for clients of average or greater difficulty. Thirty per cent found this
competition of least difficulty.
121. HANDLER, supra note 92, at 31, 119-20.
122. Less than one-fourth of the surveyed subjects are age thirty and younger and
therefore had no more than nine years of experience. Some older subjects have little expe-
rience because they transferred into advocacy, but most of these had been known judges
and prosecutors.
123. The three original public law schools have great prestige. In total eleven schools
are public institutions that applicants prefer because they are nearly free. The remaining
fifteen schools charge tuition. Fax from Romanian Ministry of Education, Post-Secondary
Education (May 5, 2000) (on file with author). Most law professors teach at more than one
institution and all maintain busy practices. Uphoff, supra note 87, at 320.
124. Fax from Romanian National Ministry of Education, Higher Education 2 (May 11,
2000) (on file with author).
125. The notary public field is largely closed to entry. Few graduates become in-house
counsel given that many business entities do not have a staff lawyer, but rather retain avo-
cats as needed.
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become associates in the few existing firms, but most are sole prac-
titioners competing for the same small group of financially capable
clients. Because Romanian law graduates, like U.S. law graduates,
tend to stay in the counties where they grew up or attended law
school, 12 6 they share the same social circle, a group that is young
and unlikely to consume legal services. Those without any connec-
tions suffer more; one young lawyer, who was practicing away from
her home, moaned, "How could I, who had the best score in this
county and fifth highest in the nation on the final bar exam, not be
succeeding?"127 Lack of income among some young lawyers breeds
talk of career change. It is a sad paradox that older lawyers, who
do not choose to learn new laws, have clients, while novice avocats,
trained in the new statutes, lack them.
Competition from non-lawyers is another challenge. In the
United States, for example, banks compete for estate work and real
estate brokers do the work that lawyers once did.128 Similar eco-
nomic threats arise in Romania where "intermediary firms," often
staffed by non-avocats, place newspaper advertisements for low-fee
services such as incorporations, probate, and property sales.12 9
Even more troubling to them, avocats lose clients to non-avocat law
school graduates, such as jurisconsults.
Jurisconsults (counselors) are in-house counsel and government
lawyers whose expertise is related to the interests of their
employer. 130 Officially forbidden to represent clients other than
the employer who pays their salary,13 1 they nevertheless routinely
represent several organizations as well as individuals. Although
some avocats assert that these law school graduates had the lowest
grades and so were relegated to low positions in the communist-era
job allocations, in-house counsel were able to do very well in the
communist era. One present-day avocat began his career as in-
126. Eighty-seven per cent of U.S. rural lawyers grew up in rural settings and 70% went
to the nearby state university law school. More than 75% of the Chicago bar grew up in the
metropolitan area. LANDON, supra note 93, at 22. Forty-nine per cent of the lawyers practic-
ing in a middle-sized city were born or raised in that community; 75% were born in the
state; and 63% chose the town because of family living there. HANDLER, supra note 98, at
22, 31.
127. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
128. Over 71% of non-metropolitan U.S. lawyers described competition from non-law-
yers (real estate brokers, insurance agents, and court personnel), and 22% acknowledged
its economic impact. CARLIN, supra note 118, at 103; HANDLER, supra note 92, at 31, 119-20.
129. Some advertise that an avocat will do the legal work, see, for example, RoMANiA
LIBERA, Apr.12, 2000, at 12, despite the prohibition on lawyer advertising. See supra note 65.
130. Law 514/2003, supra note 5.
131. Id.
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house counsel for a large manufacturer that exported its products.
In that position, he negotiated with foreign lawyers and traveled
abroad to non-socialist nations when that conduct was generally
prohibited. This background prepared him to open a firm where
he now practices international business law. Regardless of such
contrary examples, most jurisconsults would concur with the avocat
who said the counselors are "the Cinderellas of the legal
profession." 132
There is stunning unanimity in lawyers' criticism of counselors;
no avocat in Timi~oara or Ia~i offered any favorable comments.
One reason for such widespread criticism is the in-house lawyers'
admitted "clandestine lawyering."133 Clients give them power of
attorney and falsely claim they are family members; notaries
authenticate the powers; and the counselors then appear in court
on behalf of individuals. 134 Not only does this deprive avocats of
clients, but lawyers report that the counselors do not pay tax on
their private fees, which allows them to earn more or undercut avo-
cats' prices.
A second criticism is that in-house counsel, who receive a salary
regardless of their success, do not work hard or adequately prepare
their cases. Although avocas might encounter such incompetence
in litigation against a business enterprise or government body, the
criticisms go beyond observed behavior to character traits: "in-
house counsel are uninterested in their work," "they do not learn
new law," "they are not responsible or conscientious," and "they
enjoy no autonomy because they must do what their boss instructs"
(connoting lower status than avocats).135 The few avocats with a
good word for their corporate colleagues acknowledge the counsel-
ors' mastery of their specialties, but even that is a subtle criticism
because it emphasizes their narrow horizon.
Although many in-house counsels would like to become avocats,'
as judges and prosecutors have done, the privatization law imposes
difficult conditions on their ability to change their status.1 36 If
counselors could change their status more easily, almost all of
them would convert and increase competition, especially for desir-
able business clients. Avocals successfully lobbied Parliament to
132. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
133. Id.
134. CODUL DE PROCEDURA CIVLA [CPC] art. 68 (Rom.). These powers of attorney also
existed in the communist era. See Corvin, supra note 18, at 52.
135. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
136. In the first full privatization law, avocats successfully excluded experienced coun-
selors from the lateral reclassification process. See supra note 89.
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prevent admission of in-house counsel to their ranks. The problem
should disappear over time because those law students who now
choose a career in-house or for a government entity make the deci-
sion understanding the difference between their careers and those
of avocats. The negative feelings in 2000 between avocats and juris-
consults were acute, but recent legislation regulating jurisconsults
may ameliorate this animosity. 13 7
Not all non-avocats are competitive threats. The contrast
between avocats' reactions to jurisconsults and to notaries public
demonstrates the lawyers' concern with competition. Notaries
have their own monopoly formalizing documents and do not take
cases from avocats. Lawyers use notaries in their work and notaries
in turn refer clients. Rather than offering criticism, avocats almost
invariably comment first on notaries' large incomes. In Ia~i the
language used was most dramatic: "exorbitant," "fantastically rich,"
and "more than Bill Clinton earns."' 38 One lawyer claimed that in
Ia~i, "The weakest notary makes more than the best avocat."'13 9 In
Timi~oara, a notary was estimated to have earned $5500 per month
in 1999.140 Avocats' descriptions of the notaries' fee structure hint
at resentment: "the fees are based on the value of the transaction,
not the work needed" and "the fees are high because notaries are
in a closed caste, which should be opened to competition." 14 1 Avo-
cats' envy of notaries, however, is much different from their cen-
sure of in-house counsel. Avocas resort to vituperative comments
referring to jurisconsults, calling them "bandits."142
Lawyers commonly characterize the notary's field as requiring
only a little bit of easy work. One disdained a notary's work as
"ministerial tasks such as done by a public bureaucrat." 143 This crit-
icism is exaggerated. Notaries authenticate contracts written by
lawyers that would be invalid but for the notary's seal, but they also
draft documents. Sometimes the question of who writes contracts
for some clients creates tension between notaries and avocats. In
this domain lawyers offered a few substantively critical anecdotes.
One notary drafted an unlawful contract that an avocat later liti-
gated; another failed to read a contract to an illiterate person.144
137. Law 514/2003, supra note 5.
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The comment of a Bucharest lawyer, who sarcastically claimed to
respect notaries for their ability to do such simple work all day
long, reflects a general observation, one that echoes the demean-
ing references to jurisconsults' narrow specialties. On balance, how-
ever, the avocats think the notaries' work is good. (Criticism is
strongest in Ia~i and weakest in Tdrgu Mure§.) They believe, how-
ever, that this simple work does not merit the large fees earned.
Survival instincts overcome philosophical views. Interviewees
favor competition in the abstract, but seek to preserve as much of
their monopoly advantage as possible, in the face of a dramatic
increase of new entrants and ambitious jurisconsults. As of yet the
inadequacies of their monopoly have hurt the professional oppor-
tunities of only the new avocats, not those of established
practitioners.
D. Practice Areas
Typical Romanian avocats and U.S. non-metropolitan lawyers are
general practitioners. Both accept almost any kind of case 145 and
handle similar caseloads. Their days are filled with "personal
plight" cases, such as criminal, divorce, and inheritance cases
where clients recognize their need for legal assistance.1 46 Among
the Romanian avocats surveyed here, twenty-nine indicated they
perform some criminal defense work, while thirty indicated they
practice divorce law, and twenty-seven have probate practice expe-
rience. When asked to opine whether law practice areas remained
the same after privatization of the bar, twenty-six of thirty-two law-
yers disagreed or strongly disagreed.1 47 Nonetheless contemporary
avocats most commonly practice in areas in which socialist lawyers
practiced. A possible explanation for this discrepancy between
145. Less than 23% of U.S. rural lawyers claim a specialty; 8% identify that specialty as
general litigation. LANDON, supra note 93, at 129. Even firms in a middle-sized city that did
all the large-corporation work did not specialize, and included "one-time, trouble" cases on
their dockets. HANDLER, supra note 92, at 15, 41. Contrast New York City, where more than
70% of attorneys spend the majority of their time in one practice field, with middle-sized
cities, where only 17% of the lawyers do that. Id. at 33 (citing JEROME E. CARIN, LAWYERS'
ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR 13 (1966)). But change is coming. See Levin,
supra note 99 at 858. Increasingly general practitioners refer out family law cases, which
(along with personal injury plaintiff's work) are becoming a specialization. LYNN MATHER
ET AL., DIVORCE LAwYERs AT WORK: VARIETIES OF PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE 52 (2001).
146. In the United States this phrase includes personal injury cases. See LANDON, supra
note 93, at 9 (citing JEROME E. CARLIN, LAwYERS ON THEIR OWN: A STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL
PRACTITIONERS IN CHICAGO (1962)); HANDLER, supra note 92, at 55; see also Levin, supra note
99, at 858.
147. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
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opinion and reality is that the new types of cases have more signifi-
cance to the avocats. One bar official emphasized that older law-
yers have not adapted to new freedoms and continue to perform
the same work they performed during the communist era. For
example, litigation dominates avocats' practices as it dominated
communist-era lawyers' practices. Although administrative appeals
and restitution of nationalized property claims 148 are new causes of
action, in reality they are only more litigation on behalf of individu-
als, the core of Romanian lawyers' work. U.S. lawyers, on the other
hand, are moving away from litigation. 149
The United States and Romania have dissimilar economic sys-
tems, cultural practices, and institutions that explain the small dif-
ferences in practice areas. Only one-third of Romanian adults have
a bank account. Credit cards are rare even in the cities. 150 There
are few debt problems because both tradition and recent high
inflation create a largely cash economy where personal bankruptcy
is unknown. Mortgages are nearly non-existent,1 51 and the high
degree of home ownership minimizes problems of uncollected
rent. Unpaid electricity and water bills produce shutoffs, not legal
work. Unlike U.S. citizens, Romanians traditionally do not seek a
professional for merely facilitative assistance such as transferring
land, making a private loan, negotiating with government agencies,
or learning about the law. Group representation is unknown.
When asked whether they had any group clients, other than for-
malized organizations, most avocats did not understand the ques-
tion.1 52 The best they could come up with was representing several
people going into business together. 53
148. Lege No. 18, Monitorul Oficial No. 37 (Feb. 20, 1991) [hereinafter Law 18/1991];
Lege No. 112, Monitorul Oficial No. 279 (Nov. 29, 1995) [hereinafter Law 112/1995].
These new causes of action are a significant source of lucrative work for many avocats.
149. Now U.S. lawyers also do real estate closings for individuals, small business and
commercial matters, and wills and estates. See SERON, supra note 105, at 168 n.13; see also
CARLIN, supra note 118, at 17, 146 (explaining that U.S. urban general practitioners do the
small cases that large firms do not want). In California attorneys do not participate in real
estate closings, an example of regional variations in fields of practice.
150. Cretzan, supra note 97.
151. Id.
152. Contrast this with the views of "rebellious" lawyers who see themselves as having
an active role in mobilizing groups to fight for fundamental social change in the United
States. See GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERINC 335 (1992).
153. Romanian law does not authorize class actions. Individuals may sue jointly but
each party must be named and sign a separate retainer agreement with the attorney. CPC
art. 47. That avocats do not see beyond the legal form (joinder of individual actions) is
consistent with their self-image as legal technicians. One lawyer, however, did represent a
group of persons injured by a restaurant's food poisoning but was uncomfortable discuss-
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Commercial cases remain uncommon in Romania because pri-
vate businesses began developing only in 1990, and in-house coun-
sel continue to work at large enterprises. 154 Moreover, even when
avocals help entrepreneurs form business entities, the new entre-
preneurs often manage the business without further legal assis-
tance, for example, by drafting their own contracts. 155 This
unwillingness to turn to avocals for legal assistance may have several
sources, including a desire to economize financially, the socialist
legal system's self-help bias, 156 or the sense that lawyers should be
retained only when indispensable, as in litigation. Additionally,
many older avocals choose not to learn the new commercial code
and refuse business clients. Tort work is rare in Romania; prosecu-
tors pursue claims for money damages resulting from harm as part
of criminal litigation. Few avocals use contingency fee contracts. 157
Finally, the poverty of many tortfeasors makes them judgment
proof.
The effect of privatization in Romania seems limited to
increased fees because so many avocats still populate the former
Legal Assistance Bureaus' rooms performing communist-era type
work for communist-era type clients. The legacy of communist reg-
ulation, however, does not adequately explain this continuity,
given the resemblance between Romanian sole practitioners and
those in the United States where there has been no communist
influence. Under the communists, there was negligible private
property, and the only available work was minor individual litiga-
tion. In the United States, solo and small firm lawyers do the same
work, not because of government policies, but because the large-
scale economic effect of the market economy fails to reach them.
Privatization puts the Romanian lawyers in the same position as
their U.S. counterparts, not because of their communist past, but
because both lack clients who need the type of legal work found in
metropolitan law offices.
ing this activity. Interestingly, while he had a separate retainer for each client, he met with
the parties as a group and identified them as a group just as any U.S. lawyer would.
154. In the few Bucharest large firms where commercial work, including corporate
work, is significant, the clients are primarily foreign businesses and international institu-
tions, such as the World Bank. See Cretzan, supra note 97.
155. Contrast U.S. practices. HANDLER, supra note 92, at 39, 40 tbl.3.5.
156. See Hendley et al., supra note 44 at 686.
157. Compare infra text accompanying note 201.
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E. Working Arrangements
Law offices in the United States vary from elegantly furnished
rooms with dramatic skyscraper views to small business-like com-
mercial spaces to home offices. 158 Urban sole practitioners often
share space in a downtown building. 15 9 Work space is simply an
economic issue; no socialist State ever dictated where one
practiced.
In Romania, lawyers are now free from having to practice in the
courthouse rooms, but those rooms remain filled, and avocats still
share desks. Many avocats practice from their homes, full of family
life,160 but that may be no more common than when it was prohib-
ited by the communists. Almost no avocals go to their clients'
homes or places of business. 161 Rather, in some counties, many
lawyers confer with clients in restaurants near the courthouses. A
well-established lawyer used the phrase "radiator lawyers" to refer
to Bucharest lawyers whose offices are note pads on the radiator in
the courthouse corridor. 162 While some lawyers, especially those
with foreign business clients, work in comfortable offices, most
claim a lack of resources as a barrier to improving their business
environments. 163
Staffing of law offices is lean. Many U.S. solo practitioners have
little or no staff, distinguishing them from even their small-firm
peers.164 Similarly, only about ten percent of the Romanians inter-
viewed have a paid associate, but over half have apprentice lawyers
working with them, 165 and one firm hires law students. 166 Approxi-
mately one-third of these professionals receives a salary. One-half
receives a part of the fee from cases they work on and a few receive
158. Levin, supra note 99, at 858.
159. CARLIN, supra note 118, at 41.
160. I interviewed some avocats in their apartments. Only one had a separate room
with a desk arranged as an office and, even there, clothes were hanging to dry.
161. Almost half of the respondents saw clients only in the avocat's office, home, or the
courthouse. Given that most clients are individuals, the failure to see the client in his or
her home is an unsurprising respect for privacy as well as a professional norm.
162. Interview with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
163. Id.
164. SERON, supra note 105, at 80. On the other hand, some U.S. attorneys had a large
support staff, even outnumbering the lawyers. See Levin, supra note 99, at 858.
165. The salary is usually only the national minimum wage in the case of apprentices,
many of whom actually paid their employer to accept them. See Kandis Scott, Additional
Thoughts on Romanian Clinical Legal Education: A Comment on Uphoff's "Confessions of a Clinical
Educator, " 6 CLINICAL L. REv. 532 (2000) (describing the exploitation of new graduates
(stagiars) during the mandatory two-year apprenticeship).
166. Avocats may not hire law students or graduates as personal assistants or secretaries.
Bar Regulation 284/2001, supra note 61, art. 24.
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both. Half the avocats had a secretary, seventy-five percent of
whom worked a full-time week although the hours might differ
from the U.S. business day. 1 6 7 Of forty-six interviewees, thirty-eight
used a computer in 2000, primarily for research, and four others
would like to have computers. Few Romanian avocats are now
using the computer to obtain the efficiencies of standardization, a
common practice among budget-conscious sole practitioners in the
United States. 168 More generally, however, computer use and own-
ership are spreading rapidly in Romania.
As is the case with many lawyers in the United States, 169
Romanian lawyers continue to practice alone. Despite legal
authority to do so, almost none formed firms by 2000, five years
after full privatization. They also shunned other structures that
permit sharing expenses.1 70 Without experience practicing in a
shared-cost or shared income arrangements other than the
detested collective, Romanian lawyers are unfamiliar with manag-
ing such arrangements. To the extent that law firms are formed to
permit individual specialization, 7' many avocats believe themselves
financially unable to specialize 172 and conclude that a group prac-
tice offers no advantages. Despite this slow start, there has been
growth in the number of firms and other collaborations in the last
three years. 173
167. I encountered few secretaries during my interviews. Possible explanations are false
survey responses, missed timing, interviews away from the offices, and misunderstanding of
"secretary," for example one avocat's wife greeted me with cookies at the lawyer's office/
apartment.
168. CARLIN, supra note 118, at xx.
169. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
170. There seemed to be some sharing of space that interviewees did not identify as
such, especially in Bucharest. Possibly these avocals did not want to register with the bar
association as practicing with others or saw their arrangements as something different from
the statutory arrangements. The use of collaborating attorneys may be a way to gain some
of the benefits of association. The financial arrangements vary according to a negotiated
contract, but collaborators never receive salaries or employee benefits so differ from hired
associates. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
171. MATHER ET AL., supra note 145, at 184 (citing RicHARD L. ABEL, AMERiCAN LAwYERS
235 (1989)) (explaining that expenses drive the formation of firms). There is a long-term
trend towards specialization in the United States. Id. at 182, 184. Small town lawyers who
work in groups they call firms behave like individual general practitioners and do not
develop the efficiencies of specialization. HANDLER, supra note 92, at 147-49. Romanian
practitioners who share the courthouse space with other avocats may be practicing in that
same way.
172. See infra text accompanying notes 209-213.
173. See supra text accompanying note 74.
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F. The Work
An avocat's workday reflects regional differences, but is usually
different in emphasis rather than kind from that of lawyers in the
United States. The telephone controls the work of U.S. lawyers by
disrupting their daily activity. 174 That is less true in Romania,
where only recently do clients commonly have telephone service,
and many villages still lack land lines. 175 Although avocats make
cellular phones their surrogate offices, Romanians do not tele-
phone their lawyers as much as U.S. clients do because mobile calls
are expensive, face-to-face meetings are traditional, and avocats
spend most of their days in court.
In Romania, court appearances control a lawyer's day much like
the telephone controls a lawyer's day in the United States.
Although U.S. small-firm and solo practitioners spend a lot of time
in court,176 most avocats are in court daily, often until the court
closes. Not only do they appear in hearings, but they prepare cases
by reviewing the files in the clerk's office, an important task in the
civil law system. The Romanian courts open at 8:00 a.m. and most
close at approximately 2:00 p.m. without a break for lunch. Most
lawyers go home for their main meal at 3:00 p.m., but some are
beginning to adopt an 8:00-5:00 schedule.
Litigation proceeds slowly in Romania through a series of court
appearances characteristic of trial procedure in the civil law sys-
tem. 177 Most avocats blame the profession for the delay. For exam-
ple, in Timi~oara, one divorce with property division took three
years in the lower court and five years after appeals. 178 Because
laws are frequently amended, a conscientious lawyer might inten-
tionally delay a case hoping for a more favorable controlling stat-
174. SERON, supra note 105, at 118.
175. Despite their expense, mobile or cellular telephones are increasingly common in
Romania. As of 2001 there were 3,845,100 cellular mobile subscribers in Romania, amount-
ing to 17.17% of the population; 48.3% of those with telephone service had a cell phone.
International Telecommunication Union, available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statis-
tics/at_glance/cellular0l.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2004).
176. SERON, supra note 105, at 119. Sole practitioners in Chicago spend a little over an
hour a day in court and another hour at administrative agencies, leaving an average of four
to five hours in the office. CARuN, supra note 118, at 41.
177. SeeJOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAw TRADITION 112 (2d ed. 1985).
178. Avocats report that in Ia.i a civil case takes one year with appeals, but that would
be two to three years in TArgu Mure§. A criminal infraction or divorce by agreement can
take as little time as five weeks to three months, but that is uncommon. In Bucharest cases
that should conclude in about three months take six. Interviews with Romanian avocats,
supra note 13.
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ute, but that is not typical. 179 A more common but less worthy
motive is to earn more money through additional court appear-
ances. 180 Given that most avocats charge a flat fee for a case, delay
increases income only because a client pays a "gift" at each court
appearance. 181 If avocats do not report these payments for tax pur-
poses, each postponement is especially lucrative. Lawyers who
accept fees on an installment plan do not allow a case to end until
the full fee is paid. Two unusual interviewees wanted cases to move
quickly so that they could take on additional work, indicating that
they had enough incoming matters to fill their dockets. 182 Almost
all who responded said that lawyers encourage appeals for financial
reasons (an appeal costs an additional fee) as well as to satisfy their
competitive desire for victory. 183
Unlike their communist era practice, judges and courts also slow
down litigation now. The system of proof invites delays with its
dependence on experts and government service of subpoenas.
Avocats criticize judges for incompetence, claiming they allow
unnecessary proof, and prepare files insufficiently, or rely exces-
sively on experts due to inexperience.1 84 Judges permit lawyers to
succeed with dilatory tactics. A common complaint is that long
dockets overwhelm the courts and encourage postponements to
the next month's term. Courts are closed for vacation two months
in the summer and approximately one month during Christmas
and New Year holidays.
Avocats settle few cases in comparison to U.S. lawyers, thus fur-
ther crowding dockets. Some avocats estimate that they had settled
only ten to twenty cases in their careers, although one believed he
179. Avocats recognize that delay benefits debtors and defendants because inflation
quickly devalues a debt.
180. Few respondents gave reasons for court delays. Seven blamed avocats; three, the
judges. A few others offered the following administrative/institutional explanations and
suggestions. Court administration is inefficient so files are lost. Police postpone service of
subpoenas so witnesses do not appear. (One attorney suggests service by mail to ameliorate
this problem.) The traditional time consuming courtroom culture of oral argument is
changing, albeit slightly, as avocats file more written briefs. One lawyer proposes an ethics





184. To select an expert and hear his or her testimony usually takes three to four
months. One avocat in Thrgu Mure claimed that experts and evaluations made probate
cases take the longest. Given sufficient delay at a time of high inflation, experts must
revalue property and return to testify a second time. Id.
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had settled ten percent of litigation matters. 8 5 Divorces with prop-
erty division and inheritance disputes, in that order, are the most
likely to settle. 18 6 Lawyers also resolve commercial disputes, some-
times before filing a complaint, especially those involving foreign
businesses familiar with settlements and the time value of money.
The only plea bargaining options in criminal cases are civil com-
promises in which a victim retracts the initial complaint and the
accused offers some satisfaction in return. 8 7
Avocats, judges, and clients are resistant to settlement, which
explains its rarity in Romania. Avocals are unenthusiastic about set-
tlement because they benefit financially from litigation. Moreover,
avocais define the lawyer's goal as an in-court victory.'88 Judges do
not press for settlements, except in divorce cases. Ajudicial project
in alternate dispute resolution commenced in 1999 may begin to
change judicial reluctance to encourage settlements.'8 9 Avocats
contend that clients resist settlements for several reasons. First, cli-
ents distrust a lawyer who wants to make a deal. One interviewee
said he never settled a Romanian's case without the client pre-
sent.' 90 The conviction that any case may be won by bribing the
judge' 9' deters settlement of weak claims. Some interviewees assert
that lawyers do not explain settlement adequately to their cli-
ents. 19 2 Litigants intent on vengeance, however, are unlikely to
appreciate any explanation of an out-of-court resolution of their
case. Some clients believe they can get justice only from a judge, a
need unsatisfied by an informal settlement. One avocats analysis
of client behavior ties together several of these factors. Because
legal services are expensive, clients sue only when they cannot
resolve their own problems. By that time, the client may already be
angry and inflexible, wanting an authority figure to step into the
situation. Alternatively, the failure of private resolution may
185. Of course some new practitioners had settled no cases, and one elderly lawyer
claimed 100 settlements in his career. The small numbers show only that settlement is not




189. Kandis Scott, Alternate Dispute Resolution in the United States, Address Before
Justices of the Court of Appeals, in Timioara, Romania (Nov. 26, 1999).
190. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
191. See infra text accompanying notes 245-249.
192. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
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demonstrate that there is no settlement range and the matter must
be tried. 193
Finally, factors specific to the Romanian situation make settle-
ment more difficult than in the United States, where over ninety
percent of litigation is resolved before trial. 194 Non-owners, who
answer to a government Minister, manage State enterprises includ-
ing their litigation. The managers fear criticism for making atypi-
cal decisions (e.g. settlement), and the Minister responds to
political rather than legal or economic concerns. In actions
between average citizens, poverty inhibits settlement. Poor people
could not live up to their agreements and enforcement of settle-
ments is difficult. This theory is supported by the relatively fre-
quent settlements in divorces or inheritance cases where there are
assets to divide without the complexity of execution and without
future obligation to the other party.
Time in court is only one of the reasons Romanian and U.S.
practitioners find themselves working in the evenings. The
Romanian litigation regimen and mid-day meal mean Romanian
lawyers schedule client conferences in the late afternoon or the
evening. Six avocats saw clients as late as 10 p.m. and met with this
interviewer during those hours. 19 5 The majority make appoint-
ments for most or all clients, but that might refer to client inter-
view hours open to all comers rather than to individual
appointments. That is tolerable to Romanians with experience
waiting in communist-era lines. In the United States, by contrast,
the demands of the telephone require lawyers to occasionally see
clients and more often to do paper work after the business day,196
much the same as Romanian lawyers. 19 7 Avocats work much harder
after privatization than under the socialist system: ten of fourteen
193. Avocats' ability to influence their clients makes one skeptical of these explana-
tions. See infra text accompanying note 269.
194. A 1995 study estimates that only 2.9% of civil cases in the United States go to trial.
See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil July Verdicts in a System Geared to
Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1, 2 n.2 (1996) (citing Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation
Outcomes in State and Federal Court: A Statistical Portrait 7 (May 25, 1995) (draft
manuscript)).
195. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
196. SERON, supra note 105, at 121.
197. The importance of paper work in the professional lives of U.S. and Romanian
lawyers is unclear. In both countries the legal issues in small, routine litigation matters are
not complex (U.S. lawyers do some paperwork watching TV), but lawyers find research
burdensome. Id. at 121-23. The Romanian laws change frequently making research diffi-
cult. See infra text accompanying notes 228-230.
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avocats worked more than forty hours/week and five worked over
fifty hours/week-long hours for Romanian workers.198
G. Fees
Almost all avocats bill according to the client's ability to pay.
Because all interviewees bill on more than one basis, it is also typi-
cal to charge by the type of case, as was done in the collectives, 199
adjusted in light of the client's apparent ability to pay. The adjust-
ment is a direct way to capture the "gifts" received from clients
during collectivized practice. The Union of Romanian Avocats'
minimum fee schedule allows for fees calculated as a percentage of
the claim. 200 Approximately one-half of the lawyers interviewed
used this method of billing. True contingency fee arrangements
are uncommon, and some lawyers insist that they are prohibited.
Where they anticipate a substantial recovery, as in restitution of
nationalized property cases, some avocats levy "success fees" or
"reward bonuses," which amount to informal contingency fee
arrangements. 20 1 Avocats without specific arrangements complain
about plaintiffs' parsimony after a success. This is consistent with a
general diminution of gifts from clients, which lawyers attribute to
their clients' assumption that the fee charged is now satisfactory to
the lawyer. Avocats explained this with equanimity, but some
appeared eager for gifts. No one remarked on the clients' smooth
acceptance of market economics and rejection of tradition.
Almost one-third of the avocats claimed to bill hourly in the writ-
ten questionnaire. 202 In oral interviews, however, there was no
mention of that practice, with the exceptions of in-office consulta-
tions and the billing systems of Bucharest firms with corporate cli-
ents. In the United States solo and small-firm lawyers do not use
an hourly rate and only some use a fee-for-service system. Instead,
they negotiate the fee with each client in light of the complexity of
the case, location, and "sometimes the client's ability to pay."20 3
198. Although one male avocat stated that his practice had given him less time with his
family, the females found their work to be especially stressful. Romanian women feel great
time pressure (they work outside the home and also perform all the household tasks) and
express more dissatisfaction with their careers than men do.
199. Approximately one-third of the interviewees charged flat fees, perhaps with
adjustments.
200. In 1999 the percentage fee ranged from 10% of claims under $278 to 0.25% of
recoveries over $27,778. These year-1999 fees are converted at 18,000 lei/$1.00.
201. Many plaintiffs seeking return of nationalized property are 6migrfs for whom suc-
cess is a windfall. They are also usually able to afford substantial fees.
202. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
203. SERON, supra note 105, at 116-17.
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This similarity is understandable given lawyers' desire in both
nations to secure every potential client's business.
Most avocats increase their income by taking fees greater than
reported in the client's receipt and not reporting the excess for tax
purposes. The openness and prevalence of this system is captured
in one law professor's questioning in a worldly tone, "[d]on't
American lawyers take more than the amount they enter on the
receipt?"204 Avocats do not have difficulty collecting fees from cli-
ents, despite their poverty, 20 5 because they almost universally col-
lect fees in advance when the retainer is signed. In Ia~i especially,
where the bar is large and the citizenry poor, many accept install-
ments with payment in full by the end of the case. 206
Both avocals and U.S. solo practitioners measure their success in
financial terms.207  During the communist era, collectivized
Romanian lawyers earned more than average workers. This dispar-
ity persists between avocats and average Romanian workers. Inter-
viewees did not disclose exact incomes, especially their unreported
income. In 2000, however, it was not uncommon for lawyers to
earn gross monthly incomes 208 of $1000-2000 in cities outside
Bucharest, while other lawyers earned only $40-70 per month. 209
One avocat estimated that eighty percent of the local bar associa-
tion earned $150-250 monthly.210 In another city, the estimated
average monthly income was $500.211 Lawyers in Bucharest
charged foreign entities $175-500/hour.212 Bucharest offers the
most opportunity to earn $500 or more monthly on retainer to a
business. 213 This disparity in financial success among Romanian
204. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
205. U.S. attorneys do have difficulty collecting fees. SERON, supra note 105, at 116.
206. One avocat said she accepted "large fees, such as $50" on an installment plan.
Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
207. LANDON, supra note 93, at 52.
208. Avocats pay approximately 50% of their gross income in taxes, dues, and pension
plan contributions. On January 18, 2000, attorneys went on a one-day strike to protest an
income tax hike and a value-added tax to be paid by their clients. They ended the strike
after the Government promised to honor their claims, but then resumed striking for sev-
eral days in February. Paula Dumitrescu, Lauyers' Strike Freezes Justice System, NINE O'CLOCK,
Feb. 2000, available at http://ww-old.nineoclock.ro/2000FEB/2108pol.html.




213. Avocats' incomes have risen substantially since 2000; some lawyers reputedly gross
in excess of $100,000 annually. In 2003 the annual gross salary (net would be approxi-
mately 60% of gross) of a lower court judge is approximately $9,600; a trial court of gen-
eral jurisdiction judge, $10,900; a court of appeals judge, $12,000; and a Supreme Court
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lawyers mirrors disparity among U.S. lawyers' financial success. 214
Metropolitan lawyers prosper by collecting large fees from rela-
tively few clients while non-metropolitan U.S. lawyers and
Romanian avocats succeed by receiving small fees from many
clients. 21 5
Not all Romanian avocats are comfortable financially if arrears in
bar dues and pension payments are any measure. 216 In Timi§
county, in 2000, approximately fifty of 300 lawyers had paid up to
date, and some avocats had been suspended until their debt was
cleared.2 17 Some lawyers competing for clients charge less than the
minimum fees set by the Avocats' Union, 21 8 a practice denounced
with the English word "dumping." This surprises some established
avocais, who consider the set minimums to be absurdly low, such as
$2.80 for an hour consultation with an individual, $8.40 for an
hour with a business, and $28 for a divorce without property or
custody issues.219 In comparison, one lawyer charges $18 for a one
hour consultation. 220 Apprentices and new avocats accept appoint-
ments to represent indigent criminal defendants for small fees
paid by the Ministry ofJustice ($6 for a misdemeanor and $12 for a
felony) or local government agency. 22 1
New lawyers with enough clients have unusual entrepreneurial
skills 222 or, in Romania, family connections. As in Chicago, where
beginning solo practitioners can not support themselves without
judge, $14,600. One interviewee reported that about half the lawyers in Timiloara "earn
less than a judge" because of competition for clients.
214. In a middle-sized city, attorneys' median net income was "almost three times as
great as median family income." HANDLER, supra note 92, at 28.
215. LANDON, supra note 93, at 32.
216. Because avocats perpetuate some of their communist-era strategies for income
maximization, it is impossible to accurately link average gross income to the amount of
pension contributions.
217. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
218. Law 51/1995 amended, supra note 12, art. 63(e) authorizing the Union of
Romanian Avocats to set the fees; Bar Regulation 284/2001, art. 94(2). In the United States
a minimum fee schedule might violate antitrust laws. See Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass'n v. F.T.C., 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
219. Other minimum fees were $32 for a divorce with minor children, but where there
is marital property to be divided the fee ranges from 10% of a small amount of assets to
0.25% where the property was worth over $2,320. Forming a family corporation costs $174.
Uniunea Avocatilor din RomAnia Fee Schedule, 26 April 1999 (on file with author). These
year-2000 fees are converted at the 2000 exchange rate of 21,700 lei/$1.00.
220. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supa note 13.
221. Law 51/1995 amended, supra note 12, art. 69; Bar Regulation 284/2001, supra
note 61, art. 146. Sometimes no avocats appear to take criminal appointments in outlying
courts in Mure§ county despite being fined by the judges. The small fees the government
pays do not justify the time it takes to reach these courts.
222. LANDON, supra note 93, at 31.
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income from other than law practice, 223 novices in Romania
depend on in-kind income (housing and meals) from the avocat's
family. The professional struggle discourages young lawyers in
both countries. 224
The majority of interviewees stated that economic issues make
their practice more difficult. There are strong extremes in
responses regarding the effect of the market economy system on
law practice: fifteen said that it presents the least difficulty, while
twelve found that it presents a great problem. 225 Most avocats
beginning their careers bemoan their plight, hope for better times,
and, like their experienced colleagues, are unaware of how to build
larger practices. The vast majority of lawyers believe that an
improvement in the Romanian economy, rather than a change in
their behavior, is the key to improving their professional lives.
U.S. and Romanian lawyers have contrasting perspectives on
lawyering even though their daily professional lives are similar.
While motivated by similar bottom-line pressures, the lawyers
strongly diverge in their attitudes toward civic participation. This
dissimilarity is rooted in their different political histories, whose
effects even economic self-interest cannot overcome.
III. AvocATS' PERSPECTIVES
In response to open-ended questions about their profession and
its future, Romanian avocats return frequently to two overarching
issues: new legislation 226 and career satisfaction, the latter implicat-
ing intangible values such as personal relationships and status.
Their anecdotes, while not verifiable in a rigorous sense, reflect
common perceptions. To the extent these avocats are representa-
tive, their statements convey their experience of their world if not
necessarily that world itself.
A. New Legislation
New statutes make avocats' work more interesting and more
stressful than during the communist era. Specifically, client mat-
223. CARLIN, supra note 118, at 14. In rural America too, beginning attorneys struggle
financially. A practitioner's income after fifteen years of practice may be double that after
five years. LANDON, supra note 93, at 31.
224. RiCHARD L. ABEL, AMERiCAN LAWYERS 165 (1989).
225. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
226. The emphasis on new legislation is understandable. Post-communist statutes have
generated a great deal of legal work (for example, litigation to restore nationalized prop-
erty and commercial cases). Less relevant to average lawyers are various business reorgani-
zation laws dealing with bankrupt communist companies.
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ters are more varied and include transactional work as well as litiga-
tion. Additionally, litigation is more exciting because lawyers can
express themselves freely in court and take pride in being "coura-
geous" advocates. 227
Avocats are burdened by the tasks of knowing all the new laws
and keeping up with their constant revisions. Law students typi-
cally learn statutes through memorization. This method was suffi-
cient during the communist era because statutory changes were
rare, and the laws governed a limited variety of legal problems.
Memorization of statutes during law school, however, is no longer
sufficient because new laws are enacted more frequently and
encompass a greater number of legal problems. Computerized
statutory research systems are available but too costly for many avo-
cats. When asked what change in the laws they would like to see,
many lawyers answer with the same word: "stability."228
This perception is not unique to the legal profession. U.S. Dep-
uty Commerce Secretary Samuel Bodman recognized this phenom-
enon in reporting that foreign
businesses have the general perception that the Romanian gov-
ernment frequently imposes economic regulations that often
contradict existing laws and come into effect very rapidly. Peo-
ple.., want to know that the rules that are in place when they
start an arrangement will be in place.., five years later .... 229
This instability leads many avocals to plead for increased perma-
nence, clarity, and consolidation of laws. One lawyer pointed out a
statute that had been revised several times in a two-year period,
even twice in one week. 230 This situation frustrates careful lawyers,
but one cynic joked that the changes, while bad for clients, were
good for lawyers, who could bill for additional research.
The legislative changes are especially difficult for older avocats
who are sometimes overwhelmed by the new developments. Such
lawyers limit their practices to the kinds of cases they accepted in
the collectives. Older lawyers are thus able to continue leading
successful careers while losing only the opportunity to expand
their practices, an opportunity of less value to those nearing retire-
ment. Although some lawyers assert that older lawyers benefit
from privatization, others describe them as unable to make the
227. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
228. Id.
229. U.S. Trade Representative Wraps Up Three-Day Visit to Romania, Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty Newsline, 18 July 2003, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/07/4-see/
see-180703.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2004).
230. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
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transition. One avocat said unsympathetically, "[t] hey should not
complain because they already complained about their fees during
communism." 231
Among the new statutes to which older lawyers must adapt is the
one privatizing the bar and inviting new modes of practice. One
lawyer stated that avocals with substantial experience under the
communists are more reluctant than younger colleagues to ask for
large fees. 23 2 Senior lawyers can afford to open private, profes-
sional offices, but do not because they refuse to assume the respon-
sibility or lack the financial and administrative ability to manage an
office. It is surprising that among the interviewees only one pair of
semi-retired lawyers joined with novices to open an office so as to
maximize the strengths of both groups.233 Mid-career lawyers are
the great beneficiaries of decollectivization. They have profitable
practices and the ambition to take advantage of privatization.
New legislation is especially taxing because avocats are general
practitioners. Among the thirty-five interviewees who offer a break-
down of their workload, only five show any specialization: four
whose caseload is eighty to ninety percent criminal defense and
one who does ninety percent commercial work.234 Avocats justify
accepting matters outside their special interests as financially nec-
essary. Nonetheless, established Romanian avocats, who report hav-
ing sufficient clients, continue to accept almost all comers. 235
Romanian lawyers echo the explanation given by their mid-sized
U.S. metropolitan counterparts for the pressure towards adopting
general practice: "Survival ... means serving the full range of cli-
ents and cases that small settings generate."236
Despite justifications for general practice, many avocats support
specialization in law practice, or at least predict the desire for




234. The last may not really show much specialization given the variety of work
included within that category: contract drafting, business formation, mergers, acquisitions,
liquidation, bankruptcy, and international business transactions.
235. A few lawyers refuse specific types of cases (for example, criminal law) and others
refuse certain clients (for example, gypsies), but those areas of exclusion are usually
narrow.
236. LANDON, supra note 93, at 62; see also HANDLER, supra note 92, at 58-64, 148-50.
237. Only three of thirty-two avocats expressed reservations about the desirability of
specialization. Several supporters acknowledged economic pressures against specializing
now. One avocat addressed the quality issue by denying that the law was complex enough to
justify specialization. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
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Two avocats actually characterize present practice as "incipient spe-
cialization" or "semi-specialization. '"238 Tradition, however, works
against change: some lawyers are awaiting positive authorization
for specialization. The consensus is that specialization is an
inevitability.
To many interviewees, especially in Bucharest, specialization is a
trend accompanying the formation of law firms, which entails
other problems.239 One young Bucharest lawyer explained why so
few firms had formed by 2000: Romanian lawyers are hesitant to
risk working with and depending on a financially unsuccessful part-
ner. An obligation to one's partners, sometimes competing with
responsibility to clients, is an important price for the efficiency of
firm practice in the United States as well. 240 Discomfort with
change also slows the development of practice groups. On the
other hand, the financial need to share costs and clients' beliefs
that firms have more power support the creation of firms and spe-
cialization within them. Not surprisingly, the number of firms has
grown since 2000.241
Romanian lawyers wish new statutes were precise, simple, and
clear like older statutes. These newer statutes are not poorly
drafted, given the influence of European Community require-
ments on new legislation. Rather, Romanian lawyers, who as a
result of communist tradition have no experience with new legal
rights, find the statutes more ambiguous than would a lawyer from
a different legal and political tradition. Another generally sup-
ported proposal is to "integrate, consolidate, [and] harmonize"
laws such as the tax and property laws.242 The sheer quantity of
new types of legislation during the post-communist era makes it
difficult for lawyers to determine applicable rules. Finally, the avo-
cats' cry for stability and clarity represents a preference for less judi-
cial interpretation so that resolutions are more predictable. The
avocas' frustration is their response to the growing complexity of
laws required by a market economy and the challenge of adjusting
to this legal universe.
The avocats' desire to avoid judicial interpretation reflects their
concern with corruption, a threat to the rule of law. Many Romani-
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Duty to one's partners diminishes the pro bono contributions of former solo practi-
tioners. MATHER ET AL., supra note 145, at 184.
241. See supra note 74.
242. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
2004]
HeinOnline  -- 36 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 853 2004
The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. [Vol. 36
ans speak of lawyers asking for money to bribe judges, sometimes
retaining that bribe money, and attributing lost cases to the oppos-
ing party's larger bribe. 243 Unsurprisingly, the written survey of
interviewees reveals that corruption is the second most intensely
criticized problem in legal practice. 24 4 This statistic is consistent
with ordinary Romanians' views in 2002: fifty-six percent believed
only one-half or less of the judicial system is corrupt, but twenty-
four percent asserted that about all of it is corrupt. 2 4 5 A World
Bank for Reconstruction and Development report identified
Romania as having the largest increase in bribe-taking by public
officials of any country now a candidate for European Union mem-
bership.246 Even the Romanian Prime Minister, Adrian Nastase,
has acknowledged the problem saying, "Romania is ten years late
in implementing anticorruption measures." 247 The public's lack of
confidence in the judiciary is understandable; twenty-four percent
of surveyed Romanians who had contact with the justice system
(excluding police) had to "offer 'presents' (money, products, ser-
vices) to personally solve a problem" in 2000.248
243. Lawyers and judges deny such acts, but recognize that others may behave that way.
Partially inconsistent with these reports, only 2% of Romanians surveyed believed that legal
advocacy had the most corrupt people. However, 12% believed the judiciary contained the
most corrupt people, second after Parliament with 13% of the responses. If the top four
choices of respondents are aggregated, the judiciary again comes in second with 26%,
behind the police with 30%. Lawyers continued to rank low in perceived numbers of cor-
rupt individuals with only 6%. MetroMedia Transilvania, Barometrul de Opinie PublicA,
iunie-iulie 2002, at 19-20 [hereinafter Metro Media], http://www.mmt.ro/Cercetari/
Barometrul%20national%20MMT%20iunie%202002%20.pdf (last visited May 10, 2004).
244. Subjects described the intensity by which any given factor caused difficulty in their
professional activities. Corruption drew "highest level" of intensity for fourteen of forty-
nine respondents. The only factor which drew more responses at that high level of inten-
sity was "bad laws," with eighteen of fifty-three responses. That category, the only one men-
tioning the laws themselves, is closely related to the behavior of judges. Interviews with
Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
245. MetroMedia, note 243, at 24. In another survey, only 19% of Romanians trust the
courts. The mean percentage of the populations of Central and East European countries
trusting the courts was 25% and only three nations showed a lower proportion of trust in
courts than in Romania. Richard Rose, Advancing into Europe: Contrasting Goals of Post-Com-
munist Countries, in NATIONS IN TRANSIT 39, 45 (fig. 2), 46 (tbl. 3) (2002).
246. Companies in the Bank survey allege that the "bribe tax" increased 53%, to 2.6%
of their annual revenue, between 1999 and 2002. Brian Grow, "Duty-Free Dispute Erupts in
Romania," WALL ST. J. EUR., Nov. 25, 2002, at A3.
247. World Briefing Europe: Romania: Action Urged On Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
2003, at A8.
248. MetroMedia Transilvania, Barometrul de Opinie Publica, mai, 2000, at 16, at
http://www.mmt.ro/Cercetari/bop%202000.pdf (last visited May 10, 2004). The form of
the survey question is unusual because few citizens would have personal contact with
judges. The response may underestimate the level of corruption by excluding the alleged
role of attorneys in passing on bribes.
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It is unsurprising that oral interviews implicate the judiciary in
corruption given that sixty-six percent of Romanians lack confi-
dence in the institutions ofjustice, 249 and that litigation comprises
the largest part of average lawyers' practices. Lawyers in Ia~i and
Timi~oara openly expressed more concern about judicial corrup-
tion than did other lawyers. The avocats recommend increasing
judicial salaries and other benefits, such as providing a car and
driver, to attract judges who would not need illegal supplemental
income.2 50 Such proposals assume that economic need drives
judges to unethical behavior.
Limiting judicial discretion in the application of statutes would
alleviate some problems. Many avocats, however, proposed larger
scale improvements in the judiciary. To improve the quality of the
judges, avocats suggest rigorous testing, internships, and supervi-
sion.251 These suggestions apply for the most part to new, young
judges, the same ones avocats respect. for courage in their deci-
sions. The era when a Communist Party member telephoned the
court and dictated the result in a case has ended. Over sixty-five
percent of the interviewees rated political pressure as least signifi-
cant in causing difficulties in their work.25 2 The concern about
judicial ability is not universal; lawyers in Timi~oara did not com-
plain much about judges' abilities until corruption was included in
the quality calculation. New laws have stimulated more litigation
and longer court calendars. Demand for more judges is especially
strong in Ia~i, where courts hear forty to one hundred cases
daily.253 Avocals believe lighter court dockets would improve the
quality of decisions and shorten trial delays. They also suggest
other efficiencies. 254
In sum, the increased number of statutes, frequently revised and
encompassing new areas, generates more work and more interest-
249. "Justice institutions" did not include the police. Public opinion of the justice sys-
tem should be compared with the facts that only 23% of Romanians surveyed had little or
very little confidence in the army, but 86% had that low opinion of parliament. Finally,
78% of the Romanians surveyed were dissatisfied and very dissatisfied with government
activity in fighting corruption. Id. at 19.
250. Many lawyers feel that weaker or less ambitious students become judges. The Min-
ister ofJustice now imposes two additional years of training on law graduates entering the
judiciary.
251. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Among these suggestions were loudspeakers in the halls so that lawyers might
know when their cases were called, longer open hours for the clerks' offices, hiring more
clerical staff, computers in the courthouses, more courtrooms, and specialized courts. A
more imaginative idea is rewarding judges based on the number of cases decided.
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ing work for avocats. Specialization among avocats is likely to grow
as a result. Statutes in formerly unknown fields of law require
more frequent and more difficult interpretation by judges, who too
often are unpredictable. Avocats also attribute unpredictable
results to judicial corruption, which interviewees report presents
challenges almost as great as the deficient laws. 255
B. Career Satisfaction
Personal satisfaction is the second major issue of concern to avo-
cats. The lawyers ground their positive evaluations of privatized law
practice on financial success, as in the United States. 256 Avocals
generally believe that they are now serving a better type of client,
meaning that the client is wealthier and brings more lucrative legal
work.257 Many believe that avocats' status in society, largely identi-
fied with wealth, has increased since privatization. All lawyers insist
that financial well-being-more than education, influence, inde-
pendence, and other sources of intangible satisfaction-is essential
to their professional satisfaction. 258 Those with unmet financial
aspirations, like many novice lawyers, were dissatisfied with their
careers. On the whole, however, avocats are more optimistic about
their future than Romanians in general. 259
Established avocats are sensitive to their new colleagues' plight.
One gave a deep sigh before describing how new lawyers must
compete for clients: they must "fight" for even poorly-paid court
appointments in criminal cases. 260 Almost all new lawyers survive
because they are unmarried, living at home, and supported by
255. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
256. The intellectual challenge of an area of practice or public service did not matter;
lawyers who practiced law profitably gained the greatest prestige. In Donald Landon's
study income generation was linked to specific fields of practice, which were ranked for
prestige. LANDON, supra note 93, at 70, 76, 79. The absence of specialization in Romania
makes such linking impossible.
257. These written survey responses vary from some oral comments describing work
and clients as not dissimilar from those under the Communists. One explanation is that
general satisfaction with their professional lives influenced their written answers, i.e. their
cases and clients "felt" better than those in the communist era.
258. Lawyers in Ia~i were most open about their financial aspirations.
259. In October 2002, only 2% of all Romanians believe they would live much better in
one year; 5% believe they would live much worse; and 33% believe they would live much
the same, which reflects a small increase in optimism from May 2001. MetroMedia Tran-
silvania, Barometrul de Opinie Publica, octombrie 2002 at 17, at http://www.mmt.ro/
Cercetari/bop%20octombrie%202002.pdf (last visited May 10, 2004). U.S. middle-sized
city lawyers were also generally optimistic about their future, despite some dissatisfaction in
the lower groups that mirrored Romanians' attitudes. HANDLER, supra note 92, at 67.
260. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
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their parents. 261 Yet avocats think that young lawyers will become a
competitive force that will improve the quality of the profession. 262
This evaluation, however, is not universal. In Bucharest and Tdrgu
Mure , for example, avocats disparage the quality of novice avocats.
Young lawyers respond to the older avocats' criticisms. One young
lawyer characterized such criticisms as defenses against an "attack
from more educated, elegant, forceful, and unexpectedly ambi-
tious" novices.263 Most likely, both old and young lawyers are
responding to the unsettling competitive effects of privatization
and the flood of newcomers to the profession.
Almost all lawyers attribute unsatisfactory earnings to the general
economy of Romania. They predict that lawyers' financial success
will grow as Romania's economic wealth increases, or "law practice
will be as Romania is."264 Acknowledging the unpleasant "law of
the jungle" 265 that competition imposes on law practice today, avo-
cats trust that the future will be brighter despite the number of new
law graduates entering the field. Their confidence in the market
as a meritocratic force may seem surprising. Given Romanians'
brief exposure to the market economy, communist experience,
indoctrination in Marxist theory, and life in a society touched by
petty and major corruption, one might expect the lawyers to be
more skeptical about the effects of capitalism. Contradicting their
averred faith that market forces will bring the cream to the top,
avocats vigorously resist competition from what they insist is the
skim milk-the jurisconsults266 -and pity struggling novices. Inte-
grating these views, one sees Romanian lawyers' optimism as
grounded in the conviction that the nation's economy will grow
such that there will be sufficient legal fees from wealthier clients to
enrich all the good lawyers.
Although intangible satisfaction is less important to avocats than
financial success, consideration of these satisfactions opens inter-
esting windows to the culture. Like sole practitioners in the United
States, avocats pride themselves on the professional and individual
261. This economic support, traditional family and social ties, statutory barriers, and
costs of transferring to a different county bar deter migration from counties saturated with
lawyers to those with less competition. See supra note 80.
262. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. For example, both experienced and new avocats say that novice attorneys "steal"
clients from older lawyers after being assigned to work on that client's case. Id.
266. See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
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autonomy 26 7 that permits them to exercise discretion in deciding
to accept or reject work, to be responsible only to their clients, and
to stand free from state control or other supervision. 268 Even cli-
ents do not greatly restrict Romanian lawyers' freedom to act. The
lawyers play a dominant role because clients generally defer to law-
yers' expertise. 269 In discussing autonomy, avocats use dramatic
phrases such as, "I am my own lord," "I am my own master," and "I
am distinct from others, not a member of a collective. '" 270 Many
subjects balance the disadvantage of increased responsibility for cli-
ents and payment of overhead with the pleasure of freedom: "I can
work with my own team [firm]"; "I am independent, responsible,
and pay for what I do." 271 Valuing this intangible benefit is espe-
cially common in Timi~oara.
Working relationships with clients are also a source of satisfac-
tion for avocats. During the collectivist period, lawyers accepted all
clients. Now they enjoy the power to select clients272 and have bet-
ter relationships with clients as a result. The vast majority of
respondents report that current clients' primary goal-to win-is
not different from that in the communist era. Like U.S. counter-
parts, one avocat complained that overly optimistic clients expect a
victory but do not appreciate that laws and judges are inconsistent,
ambiguous, and change frequently. Despite that unpredictability,
lawyers competing for clients promise what the clients want to hear
and earn fees even when the client loses. This observation puts
267. Sole general practitioners in the United States place a high value on their inde-
pendence from a supervisor, but their difficulties in making their practices economically
viable suggest to Carlin that this is merely denying their low status in the Bar. CARLIN, supra
note 118, at 184-85, 200. Solo practitioners in the United States see themselves as the last
rugged individualists, see Ev SPANGLER, LAwYERS FOR HIRE 208 (1986), the kind of people
"who do not want even the entanglements of jointly owned office supplies." Id. at 210.
268. Autonomy characterizes solo and, to a lesser extent, small firm practice in
America. MATHER ET AL., supra note 145, at 177; SERON, supra note 105, at 12. Autonomy
includes both the authority of the avocats' bar to govern itself independently and the indi-
vidual's ability to use his or her professional expertise freely. Pamela Jordan, The Russian
Advokatura (Bar) and the State in the 1990s, 50 EUR.-AsiA STUD. 765, 785 n.2 (1998).
269. Small-town U.S. lawyers, more than urban practitioners, dominate one-shot clients
but not repeat players. This is also seen in divorce lawyers influencing their clients' goals.
In this sense solo and small-firm lawyers are more autonomous than large firm lawyers who
enjoy more status, power, and money. Richard L. Abel, Revisioning Lawyers, in LAWYERS IN
SOCIETY. AN OVERVIEw 15 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S. C. Lewis eds., 1995); SERON, supra
note 105, at 106-07; MATHER ET AL., supra note 145, at 90.
270. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
271. Id.
272. This is a direct measure of an attorney's financial position. Most solo avocats do
accept every client. See SPANGLER, supra note 267, at 209 (describing similar attitude of solo
practitioners in the United States).
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into doubt the avocats' confidence about good client relations.
There were none of the typical U.S. complaints of "impossible cli-
ents," but a U.S. lawyer might find disrespectful the Romanian cli-
ent consultations in the public lawyer rooms and office waiting
rooms full of people without specific appointments. Under the
communists, the public saw the avocat as part of a government sys-
tem. Clients did not feel a very direct relationship to their lawyers.
Now clients believe themselves entitled to attention, and to a vic-
tory-and to blame the avocat if they lose. One Timi~oara lawyer
said that clients now feel like the "avocat's employer," a threat to
avocats' autonomy.
273
Survey responses about other relationships are confusing. Avo-
cats complain that poor professional standards cause difficulties in
practice, but deny in written surveys that their colleagues or prose-
cutors create problems. The difficulty of prevailing in criminal
cases frustrates defense lawyers, but in written answers they do not
blame prosecutors. There were no criticisms of avocats, other than
of some novices, in the interviews. Survey responses stating that
judges are not a cause of difficulty (an inquiry different from the
one about corruption) are most inconsistent with interviewee
responses. When writing avocals depersonalize the difficulties of
practice.
Some avocals believe the legal profession is changing its mentali-
tate. This cognate carries cultural implications because Romanians
usually use mentalitate in national self-criticism attributing the coun-
try's ills to a mindset left over from the time of the Ottoman Turks
and not easily changed. 274 For example, corruption is blamed on
the Romanian mentalitate, so it will take generations to die out.275
People litter the street, do not work hard, or act in their short-term
self-interest despite societal harm "because it is their mentalitate."276
273. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
274. There is a Romanian joke in which God insists he has balanced things out after
giving Romania beautiful mountains, rivers, forests, and sea by giving it the Romanian
people. The joke does not specify what is wrong with the people because everyone believes
it is their mentalitate.
275. Two percent of surveyed Romanians attributed corruption to mentalitate.
MetroMedia supra note 243, at 23. In Romania, 89% think most or almost all public offi-
cials take bribes and are corrupt. In only two Central and East European countries did a
larger proportion of the population believe bribery was prevalent. Even in Russia only 75%
shared this skepticism. See Rose, supra note 245, at 39, 45 (fig.2), 46 (table 3); see also supra
text accompanying notes 248-249. The fact that a large portion of the Romanian public
believes that there is a great deal of corruption in the nation, but only 12% have personally
encountered it typifies the nation's cynical mentaltitate. MetroMedia supra note 243, at 27.
276. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
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One lawyer, with a rare democratic sensibility, explained that he
"fights the mentality of government bureaucrats who do not realize
that he pays them [with his taxes] because they are used to the old
ways." 277 Those old ways included Communist Party influence,
favors, bribes-the communist-era mentalitate. The opposite would
be a Western, cultured, or civilized view. Whether there is a
Romanian mentalitate is unimportant here because the word is a
way to label certain attitudes as intractable impersonal cultural
norms.
Optimists see members of the bar beginning to care about more
than their own material success and showing an interest in social
goals. The change in mentalitate is subtle, but may be perceived in
the avocat who proudly explained, "I created something [his prac-
tice] and I want it to grow."278 That very non-communist statement
captures the tone of a successful solo practitioner in the United
States. One element of this attitudinal change is increased profes-
sionalism. For example, criticism of low standards for both mal-
practice and bar admission shows a changed mentalitate arising out
of a concern for the quality of practice and client service. Lawyers
who do not talk loudly to clients in public areas or shout across the
lawyer rooms have increased their professionalism. A few avocats,
especially in Bucharest and Timi~oara, went so far as to predict that
Romanian lawyers will become more like those in the West,279
meaning lawyers who are more ethical, less mercenary, or better
practitioners. Avocats foresee themselves playing a role as "partners
in the justice system" rather than as mere judicial aides, their label
under the communists.2 80 Avocats distinguish Romanian from
Western law practice, which they see as "a prestigious profession
where the public opinion is that lawyers contribute to society, not
just get rich." 281 One avocat was disgusted by a law student's
mother who said on television that she wanted her child to earn
lots of money without working.28 2 That lawyer's response evi-
dences a change in mentalitate.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Romanians mean the United States and Western Europe when they talk of the
West. They also mean a culture uninfluenced by the Ottoman Empire or the Soviet Union.
To be Western is socially desirable.
280. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
281. Id.
282. Id. The televised mother explained her attitude by the fact that she had worked
hard all her life.
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Lawyers' frustration with judges' treatment of them demon-
strates another element of attitudinal change. Avocats claim judges
do not respect lawyers as necessary parts of the justice system and
give "stupid" responses to avocats, "humiliating" them in public
because they do not take them seriously and "would like avocats to
disappear." 283 For example, avocats reported that judges openly
comment about how well a lawyer is dressed or, after looking at the
retainer in the case file, how high the fee is, and call the cases of
people representing themselves or of public lawyers before those
of paid counsel. Even if the lawyers' talk of humiliation is overly
dramatic, the desire for respect demonstrates a concern about pub-
lic image and personal esteem and sensitivity to the societal role of
professionals. This is consistent with the avocats' belief that their
social status is higher than it was under the communists and could
become comparable to that existing in the United States,284 if law-
yers were to be known as necessary and respected components of
the justice system.
Similar to most U.S. solo and small-firm lawyers, the majority of
avocats are satisfied with their professional lives post-privatization
but not without reservations. 28 5 Several describe legal practice now
as "half good and half bad" because the Romanian economy is
weak. The most dissatisfied lawyers are the younger ones, who can-
not compare work life under the communists. A majority of avocats
would like their children to enter the bar, but a significant minor-
ity (disproportionately women) think otherwise, usually explaining
that "stress, instability, and struggle" for success is too difficult. 286
A few avocats express professional dissatisfaction with a judicial sys-
tem that is unable to give justice to the people. 287 Some wish they
had chosen a different career and one bemoaned the loss of col-
283. This resentment and criticism of the judiciary was especially common in Timi-
§oara county, which is probably attributable to a dispute at the time of the interviews
between the bar association and the judiciary about courthouse facilities. In the written
questionnaire avocats expressed generally good feelings about the judiciary.
284. The Romanian view of status in the United States is wrong. Prestige in the rural
bar is associated with income and profitability. LANDON, supra note 93, at 71, 76.
285. Of U.S. small-city lawyers, 61% were very satisfied with their field and 70% were
very satisfied with law practice, and no one was very dissatisfied with either. Nonetheless
6% would not be lawyers if they did it again. HANDLER, supra note 92, at 31. The rural bar
expressed greater satisfaction: 87% stated that their current situation is the one in which
they would most like to find themselves. LANDON, supra note 93, at 62-64.
286. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
287. Id.
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legiality, the increased financial stress, the changing laws, and the
lack of security after privatization. 28 8
Nonetheless, avocats are generally optimistic. Many expect the
pace of legislation to slow and their own economic situation to
improve with the nation's. Many also expect that avocats' prestige,
professional standards, and public responsibility will match that of
Western lawyers. The difference in the community activity of the
two nations' lawyers may inhibit the Romanians' success.
V. Cvic LIFE
Paradoxically the most significant difference between U.S. and
Romanian general practitioners arises out of their strongly similar
economic need to find clients. U.S. lawyers participate in their
communities to build their clientele and for other motives289; for
example, in 1995 seventy percent of a random sample of Chicago
lawyers were active members or leaders in at least one voluntary
association.290 Avocats, on the other hand, are not engaged civi-
cally.2 91 As suggested, economic forces and context apparently cre-
ate most of the parallels in solo and small-firm practices. The
differences in community participation, however, arise out of the
nations' civil societies and the lawyers' understandings of self-inter-
288. Id.
289. Rural lawyers participated in a mean of 6.9 organizations, while those from mid-
dle-sized cities participated in 5.6 or 5.2, and those in metropolitan areas joined only 2.1.
LANDON, supra note 93, at 86-87 (citing Thomas J. Mathews, The Lawyer as Community
Leader: One Dimension of a Professional Role 62 (1952) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Cornell University) (on file with Yale University Law Library) and Dan C. Lortie, The Striv-
ing Young Lawyer: A Study of Early Career Differentiation in the Chicago Bar 212 (1958)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with Santa Clara Univer-
sity Law Library)). In declining order of popularity rural attorneys participated in church
(68%), political party, business organization, country club, and service club (63%). Id. at
87. Religious organizations once again are the most common arena for lawyer participa-
tion. John P. Heinz et al., Lawyers'Roles in Voluntary Associations: Declining Social Capital?, 26
LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 597, 612, 624 (2001). An average of over 74% of the lawyers in a
middle-sized city participated in at least one civic club and 66% in at least one social club,
although membership in other organizations, such as ethnic-religious organizations, was
much smaller (10.75%). HANDLER, supra note 92, at 48. Two-thirds of beginning urban
general practitioners actively participate in organizations, especially ethnic-religious
groups. CARLIN, supra note 118, at 129.
290. Heinz et al., supra note 289, at 605. Solo practitioners participated at a rate a little
above average: 74%. Id. at 608.
291. There are exceptions to this. For example, one young interviewee volunteers at an
orphanage. More expected is the business lawyer who gives occasional talks to the Cham-
ber of Commerce. Several lawyers teach at a law school for modest compensation. One
serves on the local symphony board. Nonetheless, these are not typical lawyers. Interviews
with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
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est and professional role. Here the past does influence the behav-
ior of avocats.
Under the communists, Romania had no independent civil soci-
ety; all organizations, even chess clubs, were organs of the Party. 292
Forming and joining private organizations is a norm of political
culture in the United States. 293 These dissimilar traditions illumi-
nate the profound differences between the civic societies in the two
nations today. The communist experience exhausted Romanians'
desire to volunteer in community organizations. Under commu-
nism, "volunteering" was actually compulsory work for the nation,
whether harvesting crops or sweeping streets on one's day off.
Often a condition of getting desirable jobs and other tangible ben-
efits, membership in communist organizations and participation in
civic life were all but obligatory. The resulting distrust of commu-
nity participation generated an antipathy to unpaid community
work that has deterred the development of civil society throughout
East Europe and Russia. The Romanians' strong reaction to partic-
ipation in the public sphere is "repulsion."294 To them liberaliza-
tion means the freedom to not engage in civic affairs.295
Because of Ceau~escu's authoritarian rule, the problem of weak
civil society is acute in Romania. "Romanians must learn the 'art of
association,' and unlearn the dynamics of fear that foster atomiza-
tion."296  For example, omnipresent secret police under the
Ceau~escu regime have made Romanians leery of civic activities
even now, fearing they might present ways for the secret police to
continue their influence of society. 297 Although Romanians par-
ticipate in voluntary organizations, especially the church, more
than citizens of most other former socialist States, their participa-
tion rate is low compared to that in older democracies.2 98
Romanian history has fostered a culture of little civic engagement;
292. "[T]he Communist Party [was in] complete control over all aspects of public
life.... The communist party effectively destroyed the space for civil society." Maria Bucur,
Philanthropy, Nationalism and the Growth of Civil Society in Romania 17-18, in WORKING PAPERS
(Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, 1998).
293. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 189, 242-43 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
George Lawrence trans., 1969).
294. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
295. Bucur, supra note 292. "Post-communist civil society is significantly weaker than in
other regions of the world." Marc Morje Howard, Free Not to Participate: The Weakness of Civil
Society in Post-Communist Europe 4, 41, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC POLICY MONOGRAPH SERIES (Cen-
tre for the Study of Public Policy ed., 2000).
296. Gail Kligman, Civil Society in Romania, 4 E. EUR. POL. & SOCIETIES 393, 426 (1990).
297. Bucur, supra note 292.
298. Howard, supra note 295, at 14-15.
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consequently lawyers have fewer vibrant community organizations
to join. Moreover, avocats, like other Romanians, distrust voluntary
public activity and do not join the existing associations. 299
Self-interest, understood first in careerist or economic terms,
drives U.S. solo practitioners into civic life. 300
That law practice, politics, and community activity are deeply
intertwined is clear. It is also clear that there are at least two
motivations for lawyers to be involved in their communities both
politically and organizationally. First, such involvement may be
the simple discharge of what is perceived to be civic responsibil-
ity. Second, such involvement is a practical strategy for building
clientele and supplementing income.30'
Like U.S. lawyers, avocats want to increase the number of their
clients and their contacts with helpful people, but they do not see a
connection between those goals and community participation. For
example, after bemoaning his lack of success building his practice
and pressing this interviewer for business development suggestions,
a young Romanian lawyer said he had resigned from the board of a
foreign organization because it was not worth the time.30 2
Although foreign business clients are most desirable in Romania,
this lawyer saw no connection between the distinction of having
been chosen for the board of this charity and his economic future.
This astounding blindness arises in part from the hangover of com-
munist pseudo-volunteering and the experience of communist law
practice when skill in market competition was not important. The
avocats, however, may be behaving rationally. Few potential clients
join indigenous organizations. Many new civic groups have arisen
with the support of foreign aid, but they have paid staffs that obvi-
ate the need for volunteers. Furthermore, these groups are not
299. In an unscientific survey of Romanian cab drivers, not a single one admitted to
participating in any non-family, regular group activity whatsoever, not even a regular soc-
cer game with friends. There are many vital indigenous groups and others funded by for-
eign sources in Romania, but most average people do not join them. "According to the
National Commission of Statistics, at the start of the year [ 1999] there were 42,944 nongov-
ernmental organizations, which means, on average, one for every 500 persons, the most
numerous of which being associations of a religious character." TIMI$OARA AGENDA, Oct.
23, 1999, at 8. "Statistically strong civil society," organized without grass roots participation,
is based on the "pseudo existence" of paper organizations. Howard, supra note 295 (citing
Ferenc Miszlivetz &JodyJenson, An Emerging Paradox: Civil Society from Above?, in PARTICIPA-
TION AND DEMOCRACY EAST AND WEST (D. Rueschemeyer et al. eds., 1998)); Bucur, supra
note 292.
300. Heinz et al., supra note 289, at 599. In smaller towns, attorneys also enjoy indirect
professional benefit from working to improve the region, which increases the need for
legal services in general. LANDON, supra note 93, at 151.
301. LANDON, supra note 93, at 83.
302. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
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grassroots associations of members who could become clients or
contacts. Consequently, there is little careeristjustification for con-
tributing to their efforts.
Self-interest entails more than financial well-being. 30 3 Commu-
nity activities may satisfy lawyers' wishes for pleasurable social inter-
action in the United States, 30 4 as seen in country clubs, choruses, or
sports.30 5 In contrast, Romanian community activities are not a
source of enjoyment after the communist experience. The family
is the core of Romanian society,30 6 so even ambitious avocats are
unlikely to join a formal group to satisfy social needs. Romanians
delight in personalities, and would like to become VIPs or famous
persons. Experience, however, deters people from becoming
known publicly. In the communist era secret police informers
were common, 30 7 and one learned not to call attention to oneself.
Even though publicity could increase a lawyer's client base, avocats
may be reluctant to rely on it. For example, one young avocat, rep-
resenting a group in a tort action, did not want to publicize the
case because publicity had "hurt him" in an earlier case.30 8 An
inclination towards anonymity inhibits some lawyers, especially
older lawyers, from becoming publicly active and building profes-
sional reputations like those so valued by U.S. small-town lawyers.
U.S. lawyers are also interested in advancing their ideological
goals,309 as seen in their work for religious, civil liberties, and other
303. Rural U.S. lawyers are more active in civic affairs the longer they practice, that is
when they need fewer contacts to potential clients. LANDON, supra note 93, at 96.
304. In metropolitan law firms, the highest income attorneys are more active than
lower earners, so more than economic self-interest may move lawyers to participate in vol-
untary associations. One interpretation of this phenomenon is that older lawyers are spe-
cialists in developing clients for the younger lawyers, who are substantive specialists, and
therefore engage in community activities as an economic necessity. On average 66% of big-
firm attorneys and 74% of solo practitioners were community leaders in Chicago, where
the average was 70%. Heinz et al., supra note 289, at 608.
305. SERON, supra note 105, at 55.
306. Urban young Romanians do participate in sport clubs, patronize dance clubs, and
occasionally collaborate in community activities. This usually tapers off in college and cer-
tainly after marriage. See generally Steven L. Sampson, National Integration Through Socialist
Planning: An Anthropological Study of a Romanian New Town, in EAST EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS
(1984).
307. One estimate is "that one in every four or even three Romanians was an
informer," but that estimate was never documented. NESTOR RATESH, ROMANIA: T14E ENTAN-
GLED REVOLUTION 9 (1991).
308. This avocat refused to explain the earlier event. He also insisted that his non-
lawyer brother be present during his interview, the only subject to request a witness. Inter-
views with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
309. This is true in more urban areas and may include participation that furthers their
clients' interests, such asjoining a bankers' association. Heinz et al., supra note 289, at 599.
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advocacy organizations; but Romania's communist past inhibits
public championing of political or'policy goals. Most lawyers
showed little interest in political or policy goals that would moti-
vate them to work in concert with others.310 In fact, fifteen of forty
avocats denied any political activity, distinguishing themselves from
eighteen others who acknowledged having an ordinary citizen's
involvement (voting, but no party membership). Political parties,
however, typically offer free legal advice at their offices, where
some young practitioners volunteer to serve their party and to find
paying clients. These few lawyers foreshadow greater community
involvement by avocats.
Another explanation for the difference between the civic lives of
Romanian and U.S. lawyers is rooted in their conceptions of the
lawyer's role or place in society. Both avocals and the larger com-
munity view the Romanian lawyer as a technician, especially in the
courtroom context. In contrast, in the United States only eighteen
percent of rural lawyers regard their community role as "solving
technical legal problems," and only twenty-six percent of urban
lawyers view themselves that way; sixty-four percent of rural lawyers
see their work as "helping individuals," while only thirty-five per-
cent of urban lawyers characterize their objectives as such.311 Rep-
resentatives of one Romanian community organization explained
that they did not use an avocat even to incorporate because there
was no need for legal counsel. This group identified a "manager"
as better suited for such organizational services. A more familiar
example of the importance of role expectations would be a doctor
who, when asked to work pro bono, would understand he or she was
to provide medical services to the poor. U.S. lawyers, on the other
hand, claim an "omnicompetent problem solv[ing]" ability and so
serve on symphony boards and referee softball games, where they
can offer leadership, counsel, and a good eye.312 If avocals and the
community view Romanian lawyers as technicians, skilled in litiga-
tion but rarely counseling clients about affairs, one would not
Lawyers with a few large clients tend to avoid politically sensitive organizations lest they
alienate clients with different views. HANDLER, supra note 92, at 32.
310. The same political inactivity is found in Russian lawyers. Jordan, supra note 268, at
765.
311. LANDON, supra note 93, at 128. In the United States the big-firm specialists are
technicians, but their sense of public duty distinguishes them from avocats. In Russia in-
house counsel also see themselves as technicians, not decision-makers. Hendley et al., supra
note 44, at 707-08.
312. See Heinz et al., supra note 289, at 625. "The country lawyer is a desirable partici-
pant in the community because of his or her high level of education and understanding in
a broad range of affairs." LANDON, supra note 93, at 15.
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expect lawyers to participate in civic life. Community leadership is
not a professional norm among Romanian lawyers as it is among
U.S. lawyers.3 13
A sense of public duty is implied in society's understanding of
"lawyer" in the United States, where an advocate is more than a
technician. This differs from the Romanian view of the avocat's
role, a technician with no moral duty to serve the public. Avocals
enjoy high social status but without the personal sense of noblesse
oblige many U.S. practitioners feel.314 One Romanian said of her
countrymen, "[t]hey are still influenced by the Ceau~escu hard-
ships and cannot see beyond their own bellies."315 This observa-
tion explains the absence of altruism or ideological motivation to
join organizations but not the blindness to the economic advan-
tage in so doing.
Civic involvement supports democracy. Heinz and Schnorr have
captured the essence of Robert Putnam's research on civic commu-
nity3 1 6 showing that participation in all forms of group activities,
even lawyers' luncheon clubs, builds up social capital. 317 Social
capital in turn strengthens the connections that bind a diverse soci-
ety and permit it to function efficiently.318  Galston details the
many functions of voluntary associations in society:
They can serve as sites of resistance against tyranny .... By
strengthening social bonds, they can reduce the dangers of ano-
mie. They can foster the bourgeois virtues that modem demo-
cratic societies need, and . . . nourish the habits of civic
engagement. They can help form opinions that shape delibera-
tions in democratic public institutions. They provide vehicles
for the noninstrumental expression of moral convictions as
norms for the wider society.... [T]hey offer opportunities for
313. LANDON, supra note 93, at 57.
314. Heinz et al., supra note 289 at 616.
315. Like Romanian avocats, urban general practitioners in the United States are con-
sumed by the competition for clients and less concerned about the profession's responsi-
bility to society than are rural lawyers. LANDON, supra note 93, at 59 (citing Dan C. Lortie,
The Striving Young Lawyer: A Study of Early Career Differentiation in the Chicago Bar 212
(1958) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with Santa Clara
University Law Library)). Hungarian lawyers, like their Romanian neighbors, are absorbed
by opportunities to become wealthy and do not volunteer for social reform projects.
Andras Sajo, The Role of Lauyers in Social Change: Hungary, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. L. 137,
144-45 (1993).
316. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAING DEMOCRACY WORK (1993).
317. A vibrant civic community enhances democracy because trust and reciprocity are
implicit in groups of people working together as equals in a horizontal interaction. LARRY
DIAMOND, DEVELOPING DEMOcRACY. TOWARD CONSOLIDATION 225 (1999).
318. Heinz et al., supra note 289, at 601.
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groups... to conduct important public work through collective
action outside the control of government.3 19
A civic community leads to a strong civil society and, with the
participation of lawyers, assumes special significance in a distrustful
nation consolidating its democracy, such as Romania.3 20
In the United States lawyers bring helpful knowledge to organi-
zations such as familiarity with government processes and institu-
tions, understanding of how to mediate private and public
interests, 321 and a sensitivity to social environment derived from
their work in a profession rooted in changing social, political, and
economic institutions.3 22 A Romanian jurisconsult understood bet-
ter than the avocats how lawyers can help groups: advise about leg-
islation, litigate, appeal to an international organization, plead
before public authorities, and "appeal to the people for solidar-
ity."323 Organizations benefit greatly from the capacity of lawyers
to anticipate legal problems and solve them. Finally, U.S. society
expects lawyers to have the personality and character that enhance
people's organizing to work together: trustworthiness and practical
wisdom. 324  In contrast, these are not characteristics of the
Romanian legal profession today.
The narrow range of Romanian law practice impedes lawyers'
taking leadership roles in the community. The average avocat does
little work with government agencies or institutions other than the
courts. For example only those lawyers with large business clients
process tax or licensing documents; small businesses manage these
matters themselves. Non-profit organizations follow this pattern.
To the frustration of avocats with new ideas of practice, clients do
not seek counsel from lawyers; preventive lawyering is thus an
underutilized skill. Mediation rarely occurs and few cases settle. A
legal practice limited to courtrooms and traditional statutory
claims demands little worldly knowledge or sensitivity to the social
environment. Classic civil/socialist legal education, centered upon
319. William A. Galston, Civil Society and the "Art of Association, "J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2000,
at 64, 69. "[D]emocracy is not simply a political system or the process of choosing leaders
through free political competitions, but a way of life, a culture, a set of values." Carl
Gershman, Introduction to THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM AND
PLURALISM IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD, at xiii (Larry Diamond ed., 1992).
320. Kligman, supra note 296, at 414.
321. Heinz et al., supra note 289, at 600-01.
322. LANDON, supra note 93, at 5-7.
323. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
324. Heinz et al., supra note 289, at 625-26 (citing ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST
LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 363-64 (1993)).
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memorizing statutes, does not invite the breadth of exploration
required by the problem'solving approach of U.S. law schools.
The situation is not entirely bleak. Romanian avocats are making
the transition towards the public behavior of their U.S. counter-
parts. Of the fifty-five avocats interviewed, sixteen belong to com-
munity groups,3 25 and approximately three others had belonged to
a group in the past. Human rights activities are the most popular
(six avocats), but several avocats had pursued them only immedi-
ately after the fall of Ceau~escu. Bar activities are the second-most
popular activity (five avocats).326 Two of the three who are active in
their political parties had been equally involved before commu-
nism, as well.3 27 Other activities include charities, sports, religion,
and culture. In reality, only four of fifty-five interviewees have an
active community life, outside of the bar association.328 Nonethe-
less, this group of avocats may be harbingers of change in
Romanian civic life.
One avocat's life suggests that personality, not political pressure
or professional ambition, drives a person to community participa-
tion. This forty-eight year-old man was a typical lawyer who pre-
ferred criminal and divorce cases, but also performed estate work
and property litigation. Under the communists, he studied Marx-
ism at a university for three years, two nights a week, after complet-
ing his law degree. Subsequently, he lectured about political
theory in factories and other institutions. He also served monthly
as a lawyer-advisor to factory and small town judicial commissions.
In addition, he participated in a communist political organization
and the local bar collective's governance. After Ceau~escu fell, this
attorney volunteered for a non-communist political party to verify
candidates' eligibility for the ballot, ultimately litigating that issue.
He declined the invitation to sue former secret police on behalf of
a human and political rights organization because such a case
would be too burdensome. Now he is active with the county bar
association. This man's career contradicts societal explanations for
avocat civic inactivity and suggests that avocats may engage in their
communities in the future.329
325. Among the participants, there were real "joiners": two belonged to three organiza-





329. Id. Persons who participated in four or more communist organizations "probably
developed positive association with organizations, and had positive experiences.., which
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VI. CONCLUSION
Romanian avocals made a smooth transition into private law
practice after the startling transformation of their nation and priva-
tization of the bar. They found themselves working much as their
predecessors had before the communists collectivized the bar. In
some ways this was to be expected. Lawyers, after all, had not
always behaved as the collectivization law required; for example,
they had freely met clients at home and accepted gifts to increase
their incomes. A more influential force in avocals' professional
decisions was the pressure of small firm practice itself, a pressure
inherent in the profession and thus felt by Romanians and U.S.
citizens alike.
The many similarities between U.S. and Romanian lawyers belie
the significance of the communist experience on current
Romanian legal practice. In both nations, most lawyers are solo,
general practitioners with individual clients who bring them one-
shot, trouble cases. As such, both groups of lawyers enjoy auton-
omy, and once their practices are established, their careers reward
them economically and in less tangible ways.
Avocats' concerns about their profession differ from those of
U.S. lawyers. Avocats frequently confront revised statutes and new
fields of regulation which are a result of the market economy. Not
only must avocats master new laws, but the laws themselves are sub-
ject to interpretation by judges and bureaucrats, some of whom are
corrupt, overworked, and/or inexperienced. Additionally, estab-
lished lawyers desire the status enjoyed by U.S. lawyers. They are
trying to set aside the mentalitate of the past in favor of a new pro-
fessionalism that incorporates a sense of public duty.
Lawyers in Romania and the United States differ significantly in
their participation in community life. U.S. lawyers strive to assume
leadership positions in response to several motivations including
ambition to build their practices, sense of social obligation, self-
image as community leaders, and community expectations that
compel them to fill leadership positions. Other than the economic
impetus to build their practices, avocats share none of these
motivations.
The communist experience influences Romanian lawyers' partic-
ipation in civic activities. Among the period's lingering effects is
the relegation of lawyers to the role of technical experts, rather
have translated into higher levels of participation in voluntary organizations today." See
Howard, supra note 295, at 39.
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than general counselors, in a nation with a crippled civil society.
Romanian lawyers' narrow understanding of their role inhibits
them from making the omnicompetent contributions to the com-
munity in contrast with U.S. lawyers who routinely contribute to
their communities to satisfy their sense of public duty. The lack of
a societal norm requiring Romanian lawyers to act as community
problem solvers or leaders reinforces this narrow understanding.
U.S. lawyers have skills important to supporting civil society, but
Romanian lawyers are only beginning to develop such skills. Avo-
cats, however, have the same need for clients that encourages many
U.S. lawyers to serve voluntary organizations. The economic value
of communicating with potential clients may overcome avocats' fail-
ure to appreciate the societal benefits of community activity and
thereby motivate more active participation. When they recognize
the benefits of civic engagement, avocats should turn outward to
become actors in the consolidation of Romanian democracy.
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APPENDIX
For five months in 1999 and 2000, the author interviewed and
surveyed Romanian legal professionals to find what, if any, differ-
ences arose in the actual practice of law after the Romanian avo-
cats' bar was privatized in 1995. She conducted semi-structured
interviews with fifty-five avocats and ten others working in the legal
arena (two in-house counsel, two judges, two prosecutors, one pri-
vate notary public, two bar leaders, one university president, and
one public law school dean) 330 and asked the avocats to complete a
written questionnaire in Romanian. The interviews lasted one to
two hours and were conducted in English, Romanian, or a combi-
nation of the languages. Most interviews took place in the subject's
office, but others occurred in restaurants, the subject's home, the
author's apartment, and the courthouse lawyer rooms.
The lawyers were from four cities with different characteristics.
Timi~oara is a city of 330,000 in western Romania known for an
anti-communist, pro-Western attitude. It is the city in which the
1989 public demonstrations leading to Ceau~escu's ouster began.
In 2003, 354 full avocals and sixty-nine "apprentice" lawyers331 con-
stituted the Timi~oara county bar.3 32 There are seven partnerships
and ten professional corporations.
Ia~i is an old city of 346,000 in northeastern Romania. The Ia~i
bar had 378 full avocats and seventy-seven apprentices at the time
of the survey. It is the second largest bar in Romania, even though
Ia~i lawyers practice in a poor Soviet border region that was a
stronghold and economic beneficiary of the communist regime.
There are no registered partnerships or professional corporations
in Ia~i. The regions around Ia~i and Timi~oara are very different in
terms of politics and wealth.
The population of Targu Mure5 (163,000) is predominantly
Hungarian as is the surrounding central region of Transylvania.
This city's 141 full avocats and seventeen apprentices compose the
smallest bar in the survey, and there is only one professional corpo-
ration here. Unlike the other three cities, Tdrgu Mure§ has no
330. Some subjects participated in only part of the written survey and oral interview
and all were free to decline to answer any questions. This causes total responses to vary
with the question. Others, such as judges, were interviewed without use of the protocol,
which was not applicable to them, but were asked some questions like those addressed to
the attorneys.
331. During their apprentice period, stagiats may represent clients in lower courts.
332. Morecut, supra note 3. All the 2003 data regarding numbers of avocats and group
practices in this Appendix are taken from this source.
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public university and is therefore tied educationally, culturally, and
economically to the larger city of Cluj, also largely Hungarian.
Bucharest (population 2,009,000), the capital, has the largest
bar, comprised of 4271 full avocats and 1255 apprentices. Business
practice reflects the city's domination of the national economy and
government. The avocats of this metropolis have formed thirty-
four partnerships and 149 professional corporations.
The survey is not random even though the interviewer did not
control the selection of interviewees. Acquaintances, including but
not limited to judges and a stranger the author met on a train,
suggested interviewees. Despite substantial numbers of female avo-
cats in Romania, twenty-nine interviewees were male and only eigh-
teen female. This bias in the survey was inadvertent.
The interviewed avocats' ages were well-distributed: nine avocals
were thirty and under; ten were thirty-one to forty; sixteen were
forty-one to fifty; and ten were over fifty-one. The author targeted
avocats over forty-one because most would have had experience
practicing under both communist and private systems. Late in the
surveys, the impact of the large number of new entrants to the pro-
fession became apparent and thus the author sought out young
lawyers. The large number of interviewees over fifty-one is most
unusual. Although many lawyers in this group were in their profes-
sional prime, two were in their sixties and two in their seventies.
Men can retire with a pension at age sixty and women at fifty-five,
so these lawyers are old workers in Romanian terms. Their activity
reflects the fact that post-privatization lawyers may practice while
receiving their pensions.
Interviewees' graduation dates were also well-distributed. Many
subjects were recent graduates-including young lawyers as well as
those who changed careers post-privatization-while others fin-
ished school during communist control of Romania and the bar.
Twelve graduated into a privatized bar, after 1996; only three grad-
uated between 1990 and 1996, after the initial legislation privatiz-
ing the bar but before entrepreneurs opened many private law
schools. Ten finished law school between 1980 and 1989; fourteen,
between 1970 and 1979; three, between 1960 and 1969; and four,
between 1950 and 1959. To set these dates in context, those who
graduated between 1950 and 1979 matured during the height of
communist power.33 3 These lawyers graduated from several law
333. In the 1950s the regime was consolidating power with severe oppression and
imprisonment of dissidents. By 1979 the country was enjoying economic benefits, foreign
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schools, most from the three state institutions operating before
Ceau~escu's fall. Twelve graduated from Babe -Bolyai in Cluj, fif-
teen from the University of Bucharest, and fourteen from Ion Cuza
in Ia~i. Although many subjects practiced in Timi~oara, only one
graduated from the law school there, a public university which
opened after the fall of the Communists. Five graduated from the
new private law schools, four in Iai and one in Sibiu.
Twenty-two of the avocals performed non-legal work before
entering the profession. Many were in the sciences: mechanical,
laboratory, and electrical work as well as engineering. This is
unsurprising given Romania's emphasis on the sciences in the
1970s. Many others were public employees, including a teacher,
court stenographer, museum historian, policeman, general
bureaucrat, and public relations assistant in a Culture Palace. The
others had varied backgrounds, including work in translation, ath-
letics, journalism, business, and secretarial work. There is no sin-
gle explanation for this earlier non-law work phenomenon. Avocats
may have attended school part-time while holding other jobs.
Communists assigned some pre-war avocats to new careers in the
1940s. Also some avocals left their employment and enrolled in
recently established private law schools, which admit almost every
applicant. For example, one avocat who had been an athlete and
then an engineer made a mid-life career change after the commu-
nists fell, wishing to be free of supervisors.
The vast majority claimed that one reason for entering law was
because it is interesting work. The second most popular reason
was its social status, a more common motive than financial success.
Many interviewees decided to become lawyers when Romania was
poor, and most expressed a strong interest in financial success, so
one would have predicted financial well-being was the avocats'
strongest incentive for choosing their career (as it was, for exam-
ple, for those who left state-salaried careers as judges and prosecu-
tors to become avocats).
The social status motivation is also interesting because commu-
nist ideology did not regard lawyers as holding positions of high
status, but they were well-respected.33 4 The subjects' responses
reflect the conviction that their prestige has risen since privatiza-
travel, and high literacy. After that time Ceauiescu became increasingly irrational and
authoritarian.
334. See Hendley et al., supra note 44, at 685-86.
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tion. Accurate or not, this belief explains some new avocats' choice
of a career. 335
Two other popular reasons for becoming an avocat merit com-
ment. Those who chose law because of family tradition were mak-
ing a practical choice. Admission to the local bar, a pre-requisite to
becoming an avocat, is much easier for the child of a lawyer than
for other law school graduates.336 The lawyer's child is guaranteed
a supervising lawyer, i.e., a parent, during apprenticeship. Moreo-
ver, many of those parents want their children to become lawyers
so that they can pass on the practices they have built.
Much more puzzling is the equivalent number of avocats who
were motivated by the profession's influence in Romanian society.
Such influence is not apparent. There are not so many lawyers in
elected government in Romania as there are in the United States.
Avocats expressed a lack of interest in politics. Although one sub-
ject was a professional political candidate, only three said they were
members of a party. Eighteen self-identified in the passive role as
mere citizens and fifteen denied even that role in politics.
Romanian lawyers are not community leaders. It is difficult to
understand the social influence that drew students to the legal
profession.
A final point may be of interest. Of the fifty-five avocats inter-
viewed, eighteen had attended professional seminars in Romania
after decollectivization. Foreign organizations sponsored most of
these seminars, which centered on business law topics. The United
States hosted seven conferences for lawyers in Romania, the largest
number of any country. The U.S. programs focused largely on bus-
iness, especially international commercial activity, but two avocats
attended human rights programs, and two participated in a meet-
ing on democracy and social organization. This high level of par-
ticipation points to the extensive efforts of Europe and the United
States to assist Eastern Europe's transition to market economics
and democracy after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Especially remark-
able is that ten interviewees had attended one or more seminars
and conferences abroad. That ten avocats attended a total of
twenty-three programs abroad shows that once a person is identi-
fied as a "player" in the international arena, he or she receives
more invitations. The fact that only ten traveled to these meetings
suggests, however, that, Romanian solo, general practitioners have
335. See supra notes 279, 257-258 and accompanying text.
336. Avocats in Timiioara report that their children are excused from the first entry bar
exam. Interviews with Romanian avocats, supra note 13.
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as little interest as their U.S. counterparts in leaving their work to
learn about capital markets, international financing, or compara-
tive law.
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